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 The Drug Innovation Paradox 
Erika Lietzan* 
                                                        ABSTRACT 
 
In medicine today, we face an innovation paradox.  The companies that 
develop new medicines are highly dependent on a period of exclusive market-
ing after approval, to fund their research and development programs.  But 
longer research and development programs are not associated with longer pe-
riods of exclusive marketing.  Instead, the period of exclusive marketing may 
be shorter.  Exclusivity that dwindles with each additional month of pre-com-
mercialization research would ordinarily lead innovators to be more efficient, 
but the drug regulatory system leads to a different result.  In this system, the 
length of any particular premarket program turns largely on considerations 
not within the firm’s control.  The design and length of the program are a func-
tion of variables that include the molecule and its chemical class, its mecha-
nism of action, the disease and disease stage targeted, the outcomes that can 
be formally tested, the nature of other treatments on the market, and scientific 
obstacles and opportunities at the time.  Certain types of medicine – for exam-
ple, drugs for long-term use and prevention of disease, drugs to stop progres-
sive or degenerative diseases, and drugs for early stage cancer – are more 
likely to require longer research and development programs.  These findings 
have significant implications for innovation policy.  There is a paradox in drug 
innovation: we have chosen to incentivize research and development with a 
post-market reward, but as the research and development timeline increases, 
the post-market reward for that innovation remains the same or decreases.  If 
the length of the premarket process correlates with particular drug types, dis-
ease targets, or studied outcomes, we may be offering an inadequate incentive 
in entire areas of medicine where we desperately need new treatments. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In medicine today, we face an innovation paradox.  Companies that de-
velop new medicines depend on a period of exclusive marketing after approval, 
to fund their research and development programs.  This period is made possible 
by patent protection and regulatory data exclusivity.  But when a particular 
premarket research and development program is more challenging and time-
consuming than other programs, the period for exclusive marketing is not 
longer and may, in fact, be shorter.  This is a paradox; the relationship between 
the incentive (exclusive marketing) and the behavior we seek to encourage with 
2
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the incentive (research and innovation) is the opposite of what one would ex-
pect.  The scheme contradicts itself.1  This Article explores the drug innovation 
paradox, using scientific and historical regulatory sources and a new dataset 
constructed from publicly available sources.  Its findings have profound impli-
cations for innovation policy.  The length of the premarket period may correlate 
with particular drug types, disease targets, and studied outcomes, which means 
we may not be providing adequate incentive to develop new medicines in entire 
areas of need. 
Federal patent law stimulates scientific and technological progress – in-
novation – by ensuring that innovators can enjoy a period of exclusivity in their 
inventions, meaning a period during which no others may manufacture and sell 
embodiments of their inventions.2  Federal drug law prohibits the sale of new 
medicines, however, until those medicines have been approved by the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).3  The tension between these two 
frameworks – one protecting exclusivity in an invention, the other precluding 
commercialization of that invention – gives rise to the paradox that is the topic 
of this Article. 
Obtaining approval of a new drug generally entails testing the medicine 
in a laboratory and in animals (“preclinical” testing) and then completing sev-
eral rounds of trials in humans (“clinical” trials), followed by preparation and 
submission of a marketing application.  This process can take years and can 
cost in the high hundreds of millions of dollars (or more), and its outcome is 
uncertain.4  After a new medicine reaches the market, it may face competition 
from other medicines for the same condition, but it generally enjoys a period 
of exclusive marketing before FDA will approve generic copies.  Generic cop-
ies are usually priced at a fraction of the price of a new medicine (often known 
as the “brand” product) and are usually substituted by pharmacists for the brand 
 
 1. See Paradox, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2016) (providing second definition of “paradox” as “a person, 
thing, or situation that exhibits inexplicable or contradictory aspects”). 
 2. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinning of Patent Law, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 247, 247, 253 (1994) (explaining how the patent system “relies on prop-
erty concepts” and “prevents others from reaping where they have not sown and thereby 
promotes research and development (R & D) investment in innovation”). 
 3. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(a) (West 2018). 
 4. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New 
Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 26 (2016) (estimating average out-
of-pocket cost per approved compound of $1.4 billion and total preapproval cost of 
$2.56 billion); Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK. L. 
REV. 91, 107–08 (2016) (discussing range of estimates for the length of time and cost 
of developing a new drug). 
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product at the point of sale.5  Their approval ends the brand product’s exclu-
sivity in the marketplace, and in fact, they usually take the lion’s share of the 
market.6 
There is a paradoxical relationship between the period for exclusive mar-
keting and the premarket research and development performed for FDA ap-
proval.  If a particular premarket research and development program is more 
challenging and time-consuming than other programs, the period for exclusive 
marketing is not longer and may, in fact, be shorter.  The exclusive marketing 
period prior to generic market entry is largely a function of the company’s pa-
tents.  Certain aspects of patent law doctrine effectively require the application 
for a patent claiming the active ingredient of a new drug to be filed early in the 
research and development process.  Patents last for a fixed term, which used to 
start when the patent issued but now starts on the date of the patent application.  
Either way, much of the patent term can elapse while the company is perform-
ing the research needed for approval.7  And the more research performed, the 
more of the patent term elapses.  The period for exclusive marketing of a med-
icine is also a function of the “data exclusivity” available to the innovator.  
During this time, generic companies may not rely on the research generated 
and submitted by the innovator for approval of their own drugs.8  Data exclu-
sivity suffers from a slightly different problem; even where the premarket study 
period is much longer, the length of the data exclusivity period does not change. 
 
 5. Substitution is typically required or at least encouraged by state law.  New 
York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 644–45 (2d Cir. 2015) (de-
scribing state substitution laws).  It may also be required by insurers.  Id. at 646. 
 6. Henry Grabowski et al., Recent Trends in Brand-Name and Generic Drug 
Competition, 17 J. MED. ECON. 1, 6 (2013) (finding that the average new molecular 
entity experiencing initial generic entry in 2011 and 2012 retained only sixteen percent 
of market share after one year). 
 7. The design of our patent system –  making early patent filings not only possible 
but preferable – has its proponents as well as its critics.  In the late 1970s, for instance, 
Professor Kitch argued that early patenting allows a patentee to coordinate later invest-
ment and development of embryonic technology.  Edmund Kitch, The Nature & Func-
tion of the Patent System, 20 J. LAW & ECON. 265 (1977).  More recently, Professor 
Duffy has argued that the race to win an early patent effects an efficient adjustment in 
the patent life, in part because a race to patent is also a race to patent expiry.  John 
Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2004).  
These rosy views of early patenting are tempered by the views of others.  Professor 
Abramowicz, for example, notes that early patenting leads to less time on the market 
with the patent in force, which in turn can lead to underdeveloped technologies.  Mi-
chael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1065 (2007).  He sees this as a particular risk for embryonic inventions, where the 
post-patent cost of development and time to market are substantial, citing pharmaceu-
ticals as an example.  Id. at 1095–96.  In the case of pharmaceuticals, as this Article 
explains, the commercialization delay that results from post-invention research is a le-
gal condition of market entry. 
 8. See Lietzan, supra note 4, at 105–07, 110–20 (explaining reliance-based ap-
plications). 
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The problem of patent life that runs before new medicines may be 
launched is not new.  It has been an issue since the middle part of the twentieth 
century, when the premarket paradigm at FDA began to evolve into today’s 
preapproval regime.  In 1984, therefore, Congress took steps to address the 
problem.  The Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the drug approval law included 
a new section 156 of the Patent Act, allowing the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (“PTO”) to restore some of the lost time to one patent selected by the 
drug applicant.9  This provision was directed to the general problem that some 
patent life elapses during premarket testing.  It was not directed specifically to 
the paradox that longer research programs result in shorter effective patent life.  
And it did not remove the paradox.  Under section 156, a patent owner recovers 
none of the time spent in preclinical testing and only half of the time spent in 
clinical trials.  Also, it cannot recover more than five years, no matter how long 
premarket research took.  As a result, the drug approval scheme still works at 
cross purposes with the patent scheme.  Where the premarket study period is 
longer, the “effective life” of the patent – the term remaining after approval of 
the medicine – is shorter. 
This paradox is not unique to medicines.  In any field of technology, re-
search activities prior to commercialization lead to a decline in effective patent 
life, and the longer the research period the shorter the effective patent life.  This 
should generally drive inventors to efficient pre-commercialization behavior.  
The concern with medicines, however, stems from the basic theory of our drug 
approval system, on the one hand, and the scientific and regulatory realities of 
clinical trial design, on the other hand. 
There are two components to drug approval theory.  First, FDA’s author-
ity derives from and revolves around the words used to describe a new drug.  
When it approves a new drug, it approves the new drug plus its labeling.  More 
precisely, it approves a specific combination of active ingredient (or, in some 
cases, more than one active ingredient), product features (such as formulation, 
route of administration, dosage form, and strength), and labeling that describes 
the product’s intended uses, its conditions of safe and effective use, and the 
outcomes that can be expected.  Second, the company developing the product 
and submitting the application – the drug’s “sponsor” – must perform hypoth-
esis-testing trials designed to prove that its product achieves this outcome un-
der the conditions of use specified.  The labeling will be precise.  The disease 
state might not be hypertension but instead severe hypertension when rapid 
emergency reduction is clinically indicated.  The outcome might be specific: 
improved memory in patients with mild Alzheimer’s disease, for instance, or 
delayed progression in patients with breast cancer.  The company’s trials must 
have established precisely what is said in the labeling. 
Put another way, a new drug approved by FDA is both the tangible item 
administered to patients and the words that describe what the item is and does.  
A premarket research and development program is thus tailored to generate 
 
 9. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98–417, § 201, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
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specific information about a drug, disease, and outcome.  The theory of our 
drug approval system is that a new drug approved by FDA – itself both the 
tangible item and the words describing its uses – is the product of a research 
design and the data generated. 
The scientific and regulatory realities of clinical trial design complete the 
picture.  The premarket research process is highly idiosyncratic, and many as-
pects relevant to the length of a research program turn on considerations be-
yond a sponsor’s control.  The design and length of studies reflect not only the 
statutory and regulatory framework applied by FDA but also the chemical 
structure of the molecule, its mechanism of action, the disease and disease stage 
under study, the outcomes that the firm can study, current scientific capabilities 
and impediments, and sometimes even the nature of other products on the mar-
ket.  Moreover, although premarket programs are highly individual, certain 
types of products almost always take longer to develop than others.  For in-
stance, as both a scientific matter and a statistical matter, how one proves an 
antihistamine reduces itching in the eye is very different from how one proves 
a cytotoxic (cell-killing) compound prolongs survival in patients with early-
stage colon cancer.  The latter will probably require longer trials. 
This means that if the post-approval reward gets shorter when research 
takes longer, certain types of research – and therefore certain types of drugs – 
will be affected more than others.  Because the prospect of post-approval re-
ward stimulates the innovation and investment in the first place, development 
of these drugs may therefore be under-incentivized. 
It may not be possible to measure the impact of the innovation paradox 
on public health.  Companies rarely describe the compounds that they decline 
to pursue or abandon in the earliest stages, and we have no way to know 
whether those compounds would have satisfied the FDA approval standard for 
any particular clinical use.  Still, signs of trouble may be emerging.  One recent 
study found that firms are under-investing in the development of cancer drugs 
that require long-term trials.10  Several research-based pharmaceutical compa-
nies abruptly terminated their neuroscience research programs in the late 
2000s, citing the higher failure rate and the longer development time than for 
other medicines.11  The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Tech-
 
 10. Eric Budish et al., Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence 
from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044, 2047 (2015) (examining clin-
ical trials for cancer conducted between 1973 and 2011 and finding a negative correla-
tion between investment in research and development, measured by the number of trials 
in a national cancer registry compiled by the National Cancer Institute and a drug’s 
“commercialization lag,” or time to market, for which they used longer survival time 
as a proxy). 
 11. Alison Abbott, Novartis to Shut Brain Research Facility, 480 NATURE 161, 
161–62 (2011) (noting withdrawals of Novartis, GlaxoSmithKline, and AstraZeneca); 
David Nutt & Guy Goodwin, ECNP Summit on the Future of CNS Drug Research in 
Europe 2011, 21 EUR. NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 495, 496 (2011) (listing factors 
cited by the companies in a closed summit of companies, government officials, patient 
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nology reported in 2012 that venture capital to fund drug development activi-
ties appears to be declining at least in part due to “unfavorable returns in the 
drug-innovation sector,” and it expressed concern that companies “are exiting 
important fields of critical public health need.”12 
This Article contributes to the literature on incentives for pharmaceutical 
innovation by explaining and exploring the innovation paradox.  First, it ex-
plains the theory of new drug approval and uses historical scientific and regu-
latory materials to illustrate that the premarket paradigm at any given time de-
pends heavily on the state of clinical trial methodology, statistical methodol-
ogy, and clinical pharmacology, as well as the prevailing regulatory climate.  
The length of any particular program is a function of the molecule and chemical 
class, disease and disease stage, and outcome that a firm tests, as well as scien-
tific obstacles and opportunities that present themselves.  Second, it presents 
empirical findings about the length of premarket programs from 1984 to 2016 
using a dataset of regulatory milestones made public through FDA’s imple-
mentation of the patent term restoration provisions of the 1984 statute.  This is 
the first piece of scholarship to combine these data with the listed patents on 
those drugs, the initial labeling approved by FDA for those drugs, and their 
therapeutic categorizations, and the first to use these data to offer comprehen-
sive descriptive statistics about the relationship between drug types and pre-
market timelines.13 
 
organizations, and academics convened to explore the “well-reported pull-out of phar-
maceutical companies from neuroscience research” in the prior year); Kenneth Sin-
gletary, Pfizer Will Cut 300 Jobs as It Halts Development of Alzheimer’s and Parkin-
son’s Drugs, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.bos-
tonglobe.com/2018/01/07/pfizer-will-cut-jobs-halts-development-alzheimer-and-par-
kinson-drugs/AQPNfKywb1KWQBbWrIuTmN/story.html. 
 12. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PROPELLING INNOVATION IN DRUG 
DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT, AND EVALUATION 9–10 (Sept. 2012), 
https://www.broadinstitute.org/files/sections/about/PCAST/2012%20pcast-fda.pdf 
[hereinafter PCAST REPORT]. 
 13. The focus and methodology of this Article differ from what has been done in 
the handful of empirical pieces working from patent term restoration data in the past.  
See Jaime F. Cárdenas-Navia, Thirty Years of Flawed Incentives: An Empirical and 
Economic Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Patent-Term Restoration, 29 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1301 (2014) (presenting analysis that does not examine therapeutic categories or 
consider the regulatory paradigm and that does not differentiate human drugs from an-
imal drugs, although they are subject to different approval requirements); Suzan Kucu-
karslan & Jacqueline Cole, Patent Extension Under the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 511 (1994) (presenting 
analysis that does not examine therapeutic categories, did not find all relevant regula-
tory milestones, and relied on secondary sources for information about exclusivity); 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? Follow-
On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
L. REV. 299, 311, 331 (2010) (relying on list of restored patents published on PTO 
website, which omits more than fifty restored drug patents, and relying on Kucu-
karslan’s characterization of exclusivity status). 
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The findings are significant.  The time from earliest patent filing to the 
earliest human trials has been getting shorter.  The average clinical testing pe-
riod generally hovers between five and seven years, but applications submitted 
at the end of the time period in the dataset had longer clinical programs than 
applications submitted earlier.  There is an upward trend.  One in ten drugs in 
the dataset had a clinical testing period exceeding ten years, and more than one 
in four had a clinical testing period exceeding seven years.  There are signifi-
cant differences in the length of the average clinical testing period by therapeu-
tic category; for instance, central nervous system drugs, antipsychotics, antide-
pressants, anticonvulsants, and anti-Parkinson’s agents take significantly 
longer in clinical testing than antibiotic and antiviral drugs.  Drugs intended for 
acute use take less time to develop than drugs intended for chronic use, and 
there may be a correlation between the pharmacologic class of a drug and the 
length of the clinical timeline. 
As the conclusion explains, these findings have implications for innova-
tion policy.  To avoid systematically under-incentivizing entire areas of medi-
cal research, we may need to break the paradox – that is, ensure that longer 
premarket programs do not lead to shorter (or flat) marketing exclusivity. 
II.  THE THEORY OF NEW DRUG APPROVAL 
The theory of new drug approval lies at the heart of the drug innovation 
paradox.  FDA approves a product – meaning not only a tangible article but the 
words that recommend the conditions of the drug’s use and describe the ex-
pected outcome if the article is administered under those conditions – on the 
basis of what is known about the product.  What is known about the product, in 
turn, depends on the premarket research and development performed by the 
product’s sponsor.  This theory of new drug approval was forged in the middle 
part of the last century.14  Today the premarket paradigm implements that the-
ory and reflects decades of continuous (and continuing) evolution in clinical 
trial design and statistical methodology.  The relationship between what we can 
say about a particular product, on the one hand, and how exactly we know it, 
on the other hand, has grown more sophisticated and complex. 
A.  The Early Decades 
The modern drug approval paradigm emerged in the middle part of the 
twentieth century.  In the early decades of the century, the predecessors of to-
day’s large pharmaceutical companies were beginning to develop methods of 
testing their drugs for effectiveness, but both their testing and the regulatory 
oversight were minimal by today’s standards.  Many believed that physicians 
were the best judges of the effectiveness of medicines. 
 
 14. Kara W. Swanson, Food and Drug Law as Intellectual Property Law: Histor-
ical Reflections, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 331, 373 (2011). 
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U.S. drug companies in the 1800s and early 1900s fell mainly into two 
categories.  First, some companies offered “patent medicines.”15  These medi-
cines should not be confused with “patented” drugs.  They were heavily adver-
tised to the general public and available without a doctor’s prescription (though 
sometimes prescribed), and the ingredients were typically kept secret.  Some 
claims were grandiose.16  Second, the predecessors of today’s pharmaceutical 
industry, including many companies still in existence today in one form or an-
other, instead offered “ethical drugs” – generally to physicians, for prescribing 
to patients.17  The ethical drug companies usually disclosed the ingredients of 
their products and explained the basis for the claims they made about their 
products.18  Even in the 1800s many studied their products both before and 
after market entry, although this mainly consisted of drawing conclusions from 
case histories and surveys of physicians.19  
 
 15. Id. at 352–53; Joseph M. Gabriel, The Testing of Sanocrysin: Science, Profit, 
and Innovation in Clinical Trial Design, 1926–31, 69 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 604, 
609 (2013). 
 16. The traditional view holds that patent medicine was little more than quackery. 
See JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
PATENT MEDICINES IN AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION 209 (1961); ERIC W. 
BOYLE, QUACK MEDICINE: A HISTORY OF COMBATING HEALTH FRAUD IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 10–11 (2013).  Recent archival work suggests a much more nu-
anced view and does not seem to support the idea that patent medicine makers were 
duplicitous.  See generally JOSEPH M. GABRIEL, MEDICAL MONOPOLY: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2–
3 (2014) [hereinafter MEDICAL MONOPOLY] (with also an emphasis on chapters 1 and 
2). 
 17. Nicolas Rasmussen, The Drug Industry and Clinical Research in Interwar 
America: Three Types of Physician Collaborator, 79 BULL. HIST. MED. 50, 53 (2005). 
 18. Id. 
 19. MEDICAL MONOPOLY, supra note 16, at 157–58; see also Suzanne White Ju-
nod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm304485.htm 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2018) (providing historical background).  It is possible that pre-
market effectiveness testing would have run into problems under state law, which at 
the time viewed experimentation on actual patients (at least with respect to surgery) as 
medical malpractice.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Burnham, 39 P. 577, 580 (Colo. 1895) 
(“There must be some criterion by which to test the proper mode of treatment in a given 
case; and, when a particular mode of treatment is upheld by a consensus of opinion 
among the members of the profession, it should be followed by the ordinary practi-
tioner; and, if a physician sees fit to experiment with some other mode, he should do so 
at his peril.”); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 122 (1768) (“For it hath been solemnly resolved that mala praxis is a grave 
misdemeanor and offence at common law, whether it be for curiosity and experi-
ment, or by neglect; because it breaks the trust which a party has placed in his physi-
cian, and tends to the patient’s destruction.”).  Views on experimentation did not begin 
to change until the 1930s.  See, e.g., Fortner v. Koch, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (Mich. 1935) 
(“We recognize the fact that, if the general practice of medicine and surgery is to pro-
9
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Reformers at the turn of the last century, which included the orthodox 
medical community and more progressive members of the ethical drug indus-
try, sought to shut down patent medicine or at least rein in exaggerated claims 
and ensure safety testing.20  In 1906 they succeeded in securing passage of the 
Pure Food and Drugs Act, which – although a brief statute by today’s standards 
– prohibited statements in drug packaging or labels that were “false or mislead-
ing in any particular.”21  After a Supreme Court decision in 1911 put an end to 
the Bureau of Chemistry’s efforts to prosecute companies for false claims of 
effectiveness,22 Congress amended the statute to prohibit false and fraudulent 
claims regarding the curative or therapeutic effects of a drug.23  Again, though, 
despite the Bureau of Chemistry’s now explicit authority to police effective-
ness claims, the Court reined the agency in; a company could defend itself on 
the basis of a personal belief in its claims.24 
The Court’s reluctance to permit the government oversight authority with 
respect to therapeutic claims may have reflected prevailing sentiment that ef-
fectiveness was a matter of personal opinion.  In 1911, presented with a “Blood 
Purifier” (which “enters the circulation at once, utterly destroying and remov-
ing impurities from the blood and entire system” and “gives splendid results in 
the treatment of cancer”) and “Special No. 4” (which “will remove swelling, 
arrest development, restore circulation, and remove pain” and “[i]s indicated 
in all cases of malignancy where there is a tendency of the disease to spread”), 
the Court concluded that Congress would not have meant to regulate “in re-
gions where opinions are far apart.”25  It noted a case from nine years earlier, 
in which it had written that “the effectiveness of almost any particular method 
of treatment of disease is, to a more or less extent, a fruitful source of difference 
 
gress, there must be a certain amount of experimentation carried on; but such experi-
ments must be done with the knowledge and consent of the patient or those responsible 
for him, and must not vary too radically from the accepted method of procedure.”). 
 20. BOYLE, supra note 16, at 17–19. 
 21. Pure Food Act, Pub. L. No. 59–384, 34 Stat. 768, 768–72 (1906).  This Article 
does not consider biological products, which have been regulated under a different stat-
utory scheme since 1902.  See Pub. L. No. 57–244, 32 Stat. 728, 728–29 (1902). 
 22. United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 498–99 (1911) (holding that the 
scheme prohibited only false statements about the identity of the product). 
 23. Pub. L. No. 62–301, 37 Stat. 416, 416–17 (1912). 
 24. See, e.g., Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510, 513, 517 (1916) (holding 
that “statement . . . regarding the curative or therapeutic effect” of a drug is “false and 
fraudulent” only if made “with actual intent to deceive”); see also RUTH DEFOREST 
LAMB, AMERICAN CHAMBER OF HORRORS: THE TRUTH ABOUT FOOD AND DRUGS 64–
66 (1936) (discussing acquittal of patent medicine maker following sale of horsetail 
weed combined with peppermint oil and sugar to cure diabetes, largely because he had 
received letters from patients praising the concoction and he therefore had “faith in his 
product”). 
 25. Johnson, 221 U.S. at 498–500. 
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of opinion, even though the great majority may be of one way of thinking.”26  
The Court’s reluctance may also have reflected the view – which the American 
Medical Association (“AMA”) encouraged – that treating physicians were the 
best judges of the effectiveness of medicines they prescribed.27  Indeed, the 
AMA stepped forward with a scheme for assessing effectiveness claims; it 
would provide a stamp of approval if, in its judgment, the claims about a drug’s 
therapeutic properties were not false.28  The scheme was voluntary, but the 
AMA expected clinical data and developed a set of principles for support of 
claims, which the agency – renamed the “Food and Drug Administration” in 
1930 – embraced.29 
B.  Premarket Testing for Effectiveness 
Tragedy struck in 1937: more than one hundred deaths, many of them 
children with streptococcus infections, from a sulfanilamide preparation that 
had not been adequately tested for safety.30  This provided the final impetus for 
reform legislation, which had been brewing for several years.  The 1938 statute 
required companies to notify FDA prior to introducing new drugs to the market 
and required them to provide evidence of safety, generated in “adequate tests 
by all methods reasonably applicable” to determine whether the drug was 
safe.31 
Although the statute did not require premarket proof of effectiveness, 
FDA considered the therapeutic value of new drugs when it reviewed new drug 
applications (“NDAs”).32  Few drugs are safe in an absolute sense.  The con-
clusion that a drug is “safe” must be contextualized; it means “safe, in light of 
the potential benefits.”33  If a drug was offered for treatment of a serious and 
 
 26. Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 105–06 (1902) 
(finding therefore that statements about effectiveness are not an appropriate focus for 
mail fraud prosecution). 
 27. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 16, at 30.  This view persisted well into the twen-
tieth century.  Richard Harris, Annals of Legislation: The Real Voice – II, NEW YORKER, 
Mar. 21, 1964, at 75 (quoting American Medical Association spokesperson that “only 
the individual physician [can] determine the efficacy of a given drug in the treatment 
of a given patient”). 
 28. BOYLE, supra note 16, at 39; see also HARRY M. MARKS, THE PROGRESS OF 
EXPERIMENT: SCIENCE AND THERAPEUTIC REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900–1990 
at 147 (1997). 
 29. See BOYLE, supra note 16, at 39–40; see infra Part II.C. 
 30. DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 85–92 (2010). 
 31. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75–717, 52 Stat. 1040 
(1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1938)). 
 32. Junod, supra note 19. 
 33. Robert Temple, Development of Drug Law, Regulations, and Guidance in the 
United States, in GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF DRUGS 1643, 1644 (Paul L. Munson 
et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter Temple, Development of Drug Law] (explaining that “the 
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progressive, or life-threatening condition or if it had the potential for toxic side 
effects, for instance, the agency of the 1940s and 1950s considered its thera-
peutic potential when assessing it under the statutory safety standard.34 
Over these same decades, academic statisticians and scientists, industry, 
and regulators worked to develop a framework for clinical testing that would 
reliably separate drugs with therapeutic benefit from drugs without therapeutic 
benefit.35  As a result of this work the modern clinical efficacy trial emerged in 
the 1940s and 1950s.  Controlled trials, in which subjects receiving experi-
mental treatment are compared with subjects who do not receive experimental 
treatment, were not new.  Nor was the concept of a placebo – a sham treatment 
provided to some subjects to address concern that the psychological effect of 
receiving medicine contributes to patient improvement.36  British epidemiolo-
gist and medical statistician, Austin Bradford Hill, added the final two ele-
ments: rigorous statistical analysis of the trial results and design of the trial 
with the final statistical analysis in mind.37 
 
required showing of safety in the 1938 law . . . had always had some elements of weigh-
ing benefit against risk”).  Dr. Temple currently serves as Deputy Director for Clinical 
Science in the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (“CDER”).  See also United 
States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555–56 (1979) (“For the terminally ill, as for any-
one else, a drug is unsafe if its potential for inflicting death or physical injury is not 
offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit.”). 
 34. Drug Safety: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov’t Op-
erations Part I, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. 150 (1964) (testimony of George Larrick, Com-
missioner of Food and Drugs) (“Of course the question of benefit was an integral part 
of the safety question in dealing with a product to be used in a life-threatening disease 
such as pneumonia or in dealing with a drug presenting grave risks.  We required in-
formation about effectiveness for such drugs in order to reach a decision about safety.”). 
 35. Recent historical work suggests that the ethical drug firms embraced the new 
methods as a way to differentiate their drugs from quack medicine.  See, e.g., Gabriel, 
supra note 15, at 605–06 (arguing that the ethical companies were motivated by both 
commercial and scientific considerations and “enthusiastically embraced rigorous sci-
entific research”); Rasmussen, supra note 17, at 50 (discussing the “mutual accommo-
dation between ethical drug firms and academic clinical researchers” between the wars, 
when commercial sponsorship of modern clinical trials, at academic institutions, 
emerged).  Earlier work suggested most of the impetus for this work came from reform-
ers.  See, e.g., MARKS, supra note 28, at 138, 150–51. 
 36. The concepts had even been combined by Parke-Davis (now part of Pfizer) in 
1926.  Gabriel, supra note 15, at 604–05.  The company tested Sanocrysin (an injectable 
gold compound) for the treatment of tuberculosis, separating twenty-four patients into 
two groups by coin toss and administering a placebo sterile water injection to the con-
trol group.  Id. 
 37. See John R. Hampton, Evidence-Based Medicine, Opinion-Based Medicine, 
and Real-World Medicine, 45 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 549, 556 (2002); Roger Collier, 
Legumes, Lemons and Streptomycin: A Short History of the Clinical Trial, 180 
CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 23, 24 (2009). 
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss1/6
2018] THE DRUG INNOVATION PARADOX 51 
Hill designed the 1946 trial of streptomycin, an antibiotic, for treatment 
of patients with tuberculosis.38  Post-war funding constraints meant the United 
Kingdom’s Medical Research Council received only a small supply of strepto-
mycin for research, requiring the trial team to determine how to prove efficacy 
with only a small number of patients receiving treatment.39  Hill devised a pro-
tocol with inclusion and exclusion criteria, a concurrent control, randomization 
of enrolled subjects to treatment or control using statistical methods and sealed 
envelopes, an objective endpoint (x-rays) read by radiologists who were 
“blinded” to whether the subject had received treatment or control, and rigor-
ous statistical analysis of the results.40  The patients knew if they were receiving 
streptomycin.41  Even without the additional blinding of patients (“double-
blinding”) that is preferred today, the use of a concurrent control, combined 
with Hill’s statistical approach, conclusively demonstrated cure of tuberculo-
sis.42 
C.  “Adequate and Well-Controlled” Clinical Trials 
FDA embraced the emerging clinical trial and statistical methodologies, 
confirming repeatedly its interest in rigorous study design and its expectation 
that new drug applicants would submit effectiveness data.  In the early 1940s 
three agency officials and a representative of the AMA published an article in 
the Journal of the American Medical Association, describing the clinical trial 
design and data analysis standards the AMA had been applying for evaluation 
of efficacy data.43  In the 1950s, new regulations for marketing applications 
required that every application include a “full statement” of the “therapeutic 
results observed” – that is, information on effectiveness.44  These regulations 
further conveyed an expectation of study rigor by indicating that safety testing 
should be performed by “experts, qualified by scientific training and experi-
ence to evaluate the safety of drugs.”45  In the fall of 1962, FDA proposed 
 
 38. Geoffrey Marshall et al., Streptomycin Treatment of Pulmonary Tuberculosis: 
A Medical Research Council Investigation, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 769, 769–70 (1948). 
 39. Id. at 769. 
 40. Id. at 770. 
 41. Id.; see also Hampton, supra note 37, at 556. 
 42. Marshall et al., supra note 38, at 780–81; see also Jeffrey Peppercorn et al., 
History of Clinical Trial Development and the Pharmaceutical Industry, in 
PHARMACEUTICAL SCIENCES ENCYCLOPEDIA: DRUG DISCOVERY, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
MANUFACTURING 1, 7 (Shayne C. Gad ed., 2010). 
 43. Walton Van Winkle, Jr., et al., Laboratory and Clinical Appraisal of New 
Drugs, 126 JAMA 958 (1944). 
 44. Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 
21 Fed. Reg. 5576, 5578 (July 25, 1956) (promulgating 21 C.F.R. § 130.4, describing 
the contents of a new drug application). 
 45. Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 
21 Fed. Reg. at 5578. 
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regulations to reshape the premarket clinical trial process.46  This proposal laid 
out the now well-accepted sequence of preclinical safety testing, followed by 
a formal submission to the agency – known today as the investigational new 
drug application (“IND”) – before clinical trials.47  It also emphasized the role 
of effectiveness data; an IND would not be accepted unless the sponsor planned 
to collect a case history for every subject, with information about results and 
an opinion whether useful results were attributable to the drug under investiga-
tion.48 
The Kefauver-Harris amendments, passed in October 1962, imposed a 
new drug approval requirement, formally shifting the burden of proof to drug 
sponsors.49  The statute also expressly required proof of effectiveness, in addi-
tion to proof of safety.50  But these are not the aspects of the legislation most 
important to understanding the impact of the innovation paradox in the field of 
medicine.  The effectiveness requirement was not novel, after all.  Instead, the 
most significant aspects were the specification of an evidentiary standard for 
new drugs, tied directly to the words used in the labeling to describe the results 
that could be expected, and the specification of a clinical trial methodology.51  
Specifically, a new drug application required substantial evidence of effective-
ness under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the 
labeling.52  Substantial evidence in turn meant data from adequate and well-
controlled investigations, including clinical (human) investigations.53  By 
1970, FDA had explained that this embodied the principles of study design and 
data analysis that had been developing in the preceding decades: a method of 
subject selection that reduces variability, assignment of subjects to test groups 
 
 46. New Drugs for Investigational Use: Proposed Exemptions, 27 Fed. Reg. 7990, 
7990–91 (Aug. 10, 1962). 
 47. Id.  An IND would describe the preclinical investigations showing that it was 
reasonably safe to start human trials, and it would identify and describe the clinical 
investigators.  Id. at 7990.  It would also explain the nature and duration of every 
planned stage of investigation.  Id. at 7991.  Prior regulations exempting investigational 
new drugs from the NDA requirement had imposed only modest labeling and record-
keeping requirements.  21 C.F.R. § 130.3 (1962). 
 48. New Drugs for Investigational Use: Proposed Exemptions, 27 Fed. Reg. at 
7992. 
 49. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87–781, § 103, 76 Stat. 780, 783 
(1962) (amending Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) § 505). 
 50. Id. § 102(a), 76 Stat. at 781 (amending FDCA § 201(p)). 
 51. Cf. Temple, Development of Drug Law, supra note 33, at 1650 (“[T]he im-
pression that the critical event in 1962 was the effectiveness requirement is wrong and 
over-simple.”); Junod, supra note 19 (arguing that the strength of the new law was not 
the substantial evidence provision but its focus on study methods); Leonard G. Schifrin, 
Lessons from the Drug Lag: A Retrospective Analysis of the 1962 Drug Regulations, 5 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 101–02 (1982) (suggesting that the thrust of the 1962 
amendments was tying proof to claims and thus narrowing the scope of the latter). 
 52. § 102(c), 76 Stat. at 781 (amending FDCA § 505(d)). 
 53. Id. 
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in a way that minimizes bias, use of a control, methods of observing and re-
cording results that minimize bias on the part of the subject and the observer, 
quantitative results, and evaluation of results using appropriate statistical meth-
ods.54 
Over the years, FDA and the more experienced pharmaceutical firms have 
worked together to refine their shared expectations about clinical trial design 
and data analysis.55  For instance, nearly three decades after the agency issued 
its regulation explaining “adequate and well-controlled trials,” it observed that 
the “science and practice of drug development and clinical evaluation ha[d] 
evolved significantly,” prompting it to issue comprehensive guidance on 
demonstrating efficacy.56  In that same time, statistical methods also grew more 
complex and sophisticated.57  Citing a “proliferation of statistical research in 
the area of clinical trials,” FDA and its peer regulators in Japan and Europe 
developed joint guidance on the principles of statistical methodology applied 
to clinical trials.58  FDA’s 1998 document lays out the agency’s expectations 
regarding the statistical issues associated with trial design, trial conduct, and 
data analysis.59 
FDA also notes in this document that better understanding of the patho-
genesis of disease and disease staging as well as progress in clinical evaluation 
and clinical pharmacology affect the amount and type of data needed to support 
approval in any particular case.60  Indeed, the evolution since 1962 has uncov-
 
 54. Hearing Regulations and Regulations Describing Scientific Content of Ade-
quate and Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 7250, 7250–51 (May 
8, 1970) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130); see also 21 C.F.R. § 130.12(a)(5)(ii) 
(1970) (claiming that the new regulation restated principles that had been “developed 
over a period of years” and were now “recognized by the scientific community as the 
essentials of adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations”). 
 55. See generally CARPENTER, supra note 30, at 495–96 (arguing that some of the 
standards “were advanced by the Bureau of Medicine, but also . . . were developments 
. . . at the intersection of science, regulation, and more progressive elements of the 
pharmaceutical industry”). 
 56. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: PROVIDING CLINICAL EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN DRUGS 
AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 2, 16 (May 1998), https://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dock-
ets/ac/06/briefing/2006-4227B1-02-02-FDA-Appendix1.pdf [hereinafter CLINICAL 
EFFICACY GUIDANCE]. 
 57. See Anthony C. Segreti et al., Biopharmaceutical Statistics in a Pharmaceuti-
cal Regulated Environment: Past, Present, and Future, 11 J.  BIOPHARMACEUTICAL 
STAT. 347, 348–65 (2001) (providing an accessible history of biopharmaceutical statis-
tical practices and requirements from 1975 to 2000). 
 58. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: E9 STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES FOR CLINICAL TRIALS 1 (Sept. 1998), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinfor-
mation/guidances/ucm073137.pdf [hereinafter FDA, E9 GUIDANCE]. 
 59. Id. at 14–34. 
 60. See id. at 2. 
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ered an important truth: data expectations and the clinical trial designs to pro-
duce those data vary considerably.  The agency has now issued more than two 
dozen guidelines regarding clinical trial design and data requirements, thera-
peutic class by therapeutic class.61  Part IV of this Article explores this varia-
bility. 
D.  New Drug Approval Theory 
The modern drug approval paradigm traces its origins to the 1962 amend-
ments.  As written in statute and implemented by FDA in the decades that fol-
lowed, the paradigm reflects two basic principles that together comprise new 
drug approval theory: first, FDA’s authority over a new drug derives from and 
revolves around the words used to describe the drug, and second, the research 
performed by the drug’s sponsor defines the drug. 
As a general rule, it is words – not substances – that trigger FDA’s drug 
authority.  Under federal law, an article is a “drug” regulated by FDA if the 
article is intended for a particular type of use – to treat a disease, for instance.62  
This refers to the objective intended use of the item, which is generally deter-
mined by reference to express claims made by the product’s manufacturer.63  
Thus, for instance, thalidomide is simply a chemical substance unless and until 
it is labeled for use in treatment of multiple myeloma.  Further, a drug is a “new 
drug” that requires an NDA if it is not generally recognized as safe and effec-
tive for the uses described in its labeling.64  Labeling broadly means any written 
or printed material associated with both the manufacturer and the product.65  
 
 61. Temple, supra note 33, at 1646 (noting FDA’s “increasingly strenuous at-
tempts to make known what its requirements for approval would be” and the “nearly 
30 drug class clinical guidelines . . . describing in detail the study designs and expected 
data for particular therapeutic classes”). 
 62. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2012). 
 63. S. REP. NO. 74-361, at 4 (1935) (“The use to which the product is to be put will 
determine the category into which it will fall. . . . The manufacturer of the article, 
through his representations in connection with its sale, can determine the use to which 
the article is to be put.”); Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 238–
39 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (treating this Senate passage as authoritative); United States v. An 
Article Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bottles, 409 F.2d 734, 739 n.3 (2d Cir. 1969) (fol-
lowing same interpretation); United States v. 23, More or Less,  Articles, 192 F.2d 308, 
310 (2d Cir. 1951) (same).  Intended use is the intent communicated in the market gen-
erally through claims and representations in a product’s labeling and advertising.  See 
Brief for Respondent R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. at 12 n.11, FDA v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (No. 98-1152) (brief authored by former 
Chief Counsel of FDA, noting that “intent is ‘objective’ in that its locus is not the mind 
of any person, but the marketing communications, themselves”); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 
201.128, 801.4 (2017) (defining intended use). 
 64. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(p)(1) (West 2018). 
 65. Id. § 321(m); Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 348, 350 (1948) (holding 
that pamphlets shipped by drug maker under separate cover were “labeling” because of 
their “textual relationship” to the drugs, that is, they “explained their uses”). 
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Words, in labeling written by a company about its product, make an article a 
new drug that requires an NDA. 
The application in turn must show that the drug is safe for use under the 
conditions described in the labeling, and it must provide substantial evidence 
that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the 
conditions described in the labeling.66  The application therefore describes the 
product (including how it is made) and proposes labeling.67  The company’s 
research program and results – which are presented in its application – must 
prove what is proposed for the labeling of the product.  Regardless of the ac-
curacy of the initially proposed labeling, when FDA approves the drug product, 
it will approve only labeling that reflects what the research proved.68 
The labeling approved by FDA tells prescribers about the specific medi-
cal conditions for which the drug has been approved (its “indications”) and 
describes the outcomes that can be expected under specific conditions of use 
(such as dosing).  Agency regulations specify precisely what must, may, and 
may not be included in the labeling.69  These regulations require the labeling 
to synthesize the information in the application – especially the research design 
and results – into digestible advice for prescribers.70  For instance, the labeling 
must describe every clinical trial that would facilitate understanding how to use 
the drug safely and effectively.71  If a particular study supported effectiveness 
for the labeled indication, the labeling must describe the study design and its 
results.72  If evidence is lacking with respect to a particular subpopulation, the 
labeling must describe this limitation succinctly.73  Special instructions for dis-
tinct populations may be included, based on the data in the clinical trials.74  
Every section of the labeling is grounded in the application submitted and in 
the company’s and agency’s analysis of the data and information in the appli-
cation. 
FDA’s approval of an application and thus a product and labeling repre-
sents its conclusion that the drug is safe and effective under the conditions of 
use in that labeling – for that indication, with those dosing instructions, subject 
 
 66. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d) (West 2018). 
 67. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2017). 
 68. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d)(1)–(5), (7) (West 2018). 
 69. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (2017). 
 70. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription 
Drugs and Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 
81082, 81082 (proposed Dec. 22, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201) (referring 
to the professional labeling as “the primary mechanism through which FDA and drug 
manufacturers communicate essential, science-based prescribing information to health 
care professionals” and noting that it “is a compilation of information based on a thor-
ough analysis of the new drug application”). 
 71. § 201.57(c)(15). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. § 201.57(c)(2)(i)(B). 
 74. Id. § 201.57(c)(9)(vi). 
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to those warnings and precautions.75  The 1962 amendments linked clinical 
trial design and the resulting data to the words that would be approved by FDA 
in connection with approval of the drug.  Because the agency approves both 
the tangible item and its labeling together as a single unit, modern drug ap-
proval theory means that research design and results dictate the scope of the 
approval and thus define the product approved for patients. 
III.  INCENTIVES FOR DRUG INNOVATION 
The primary incentive to discover and develop a new medicine in the 
United States is the prospect of a period for exclusive marketing – commer-
cialization without competition from cheaper copycat products.  During this 
period, the company may be able to recover the investment it made in devel-
oping the medicine as well as others that are less successful or that failed before 
approval, and it may be able to enjoy a profit.76  This period is made possible 
by several features of federal law, the most significant of which are protection 
of patents associated with the medicine and protection of research data gath-
ered during testing under the drug approval statute. 
A.  Patent Exclusivity 
Federal law permits the patenting of any “new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter” as well as any “new and useful 
improvement[s] thereof,” provided the other conditions and requirements of 
the Patent Act are satisfied.77  The sponsor of a new drug may own (or exclu-
sively license) a variety of patents in connection with that drug. 
For instance, the sponsor may own a patent claiming the drug’s active 
ingredient, which in simple terms is the component of the product that fur-
nishes its pharmacological activity.78  The active ingredient directly effects the 
 
 75. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d) (West 2018). 
 76. Henry Grabowski et al., The Roles of Patents and Research and Development 
Incentives in Biopharmaceutical Innovation, 34 HEALTH AFF. 302, 302 (2015) (“Pa-
tents and other forms of intellectual property protection are generally thought to play 
essential roles in encouraging innovation in biopharmaceuticals.”); Mark A. Lemley, 
The Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 114–15 (2013) (“In the 
pharmaceutical industry the government requires perhaps ten years of safety and effi-
cacy review, costing hundreds of millions of dollars in research, development, testing, 
and marketing, before allowing the launch of a pharmaceutical product. . . . The patent 
system guarantees insulation from competition for a substantial period of time so com-
panies can recover the money the government made them invest in the first place.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 77. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 78. FDA uses the phrase “active moiety” for the biologically active substance at 
the site of action at the body and the phrase “active ingredient” for the substance as 
introduced to the body.  21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2017); Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 
984, 987–88 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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treatment of the disease in question.79  FDA calls this a “drug substance” pa-
tent.80  Patent law provides an inventor with a strong incentive to file the ap-
plication for this patent as early as possible.  This is because, as a general rule, 
a patent will be denied if the invention was in “public use” for more than a year 
before the patent application was filed.81  Although the matter is not entirely 
free from doubt, use of an invention in a clinical trial may in some cases con-
stitute public use.82  Publication of the invention more than a year before the 
patent application can similarly lead to denial of the patent.83  Conventional 
wisdom holds that new drug sponsors should and do file for active ingredient 
patents before clinical testing.84 
It is possible to file well before clinical testing begins because patent law 
does not require proof of safety and effectiveness in the FDA regulatory sense.  
The goal of the regulatory premarket program for a new drug is to show that 
the benefits (the therapeutic outcomes assessed in hypothesis-testing human 
trials) of the finished product (active ingredient, formulation, route of admin-
istration, dosage form, and strength) outweigh its risks when the product is used 
as described in its labeling.85  Safety and effectiveness are clinical and regula-
tory concepts and evolving ones at that.  Patent law imposes its own “utility” 
 
 79. In addition to treating a disease, a drug (and thus its active ingredient, which 
is also a drug) can diagnose, cure, mitigate, or prevent a disease or affect the structure 
or function of the body.  21 U.S.C.A. § 321(g)(1) (West 2018). 
 80. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2017). 
 81. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2012).  Congress reworked this provision in 2011, but 
the basic concept remains true today.  See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011). 
 82. See Christopher M. Holman, Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 MO. L. REV. 645, 659–60 (2011) (discussing the “not 
entirely unambiguous” issue of whether human clinical trials are patent-invalidating 
public use of the claimed invention).  In 2013, the Federal Circuit reversed a lower 
court summary judgment of invalidity grounded in a finding that a clinical trial consti-
tuted clear and convincing evidence of public use.  Dey, L.P. v. Sunovian Pharm., Inc., 
715 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  The matter was remanded to determine whether 
the study was conducted with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality as to the na-
ture of the formulations tested.  Id. at 1360. 
 83. See, e.g., Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Caraco Pharm. Labs, Ltd., 476 F.3d 
1321, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining how a prior publication forced Ortho-
McNeil to narrow the scope of its patent); Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and 
the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 522–24 (2009) (offering numerous 
examples). 
 84. See, e.g., Roin, supra note 83, at 539 (stating that “[p]harmaceutical patents 
are typically filed when drugs are in early preclinical research”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 
348 (2007) (noting that applications for “composition of matter” patents are filed before 
clinical testing of a molecule begins). 
 85. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(viii) (2017) (requiring NDAs to discuss “why the 
benefits exceed the risks under the conditions stated in the labeling”); FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CRITICAL PATH OPPORTUNITIES 
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requirement, the contours of which are admittedly much debated, but it has 
been clear for almost forty years that with respect to substances that may ulti-
mately comprise part of a new drug product approved by FDA, utility is a ques-
tion of having a desirable biological activity and ordinarily can be demon-
strated with preclinical evidence.86 
In addition to the active ingredient patent, the sponsor of a medicine may 
hold a patent claiming the formulation or composition of the particular finished 
product.87  For instance, the patent might claim the particular combination of 
active and inactive ingredients or the particular dosage form and dosage.88  
FDA calls these “drug product” patents.89  The sponsor might hold a patent 
claiming an approved method of using or administering the product, which 
FDA calls a “use” patent.90  Other possibilities include patents claiming the 
manufacturing process, claiming an intermediate chemical entity used during 
the manufacturing process, or claiming a metabolite of the active ingredient.91 
 
REPORT at R-8 (2006), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/scienceresearch/specialtop-
ics/criticalpathinitiative/criticalpathopportunitiesreports/ucm077254.pdf [hereinafter 
FDA CRITICAL PATH REPORT] (suggesting approval once “uncertainty” about benefit-
risk balance has been “reduced to an acceptable level”); see also United States v. Ruth-
erford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979) (FDA “generally considers a drug safe when the ex-
pected therapeutic gain justifies the risk entailed by its use.”). 
 86. See Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (finding utility on 
the basis of data demonstrating pharmacodynamic activity in animals, specifically, 
stimulating smooth muscle tissue in gerbils and modulating blood pressure in rats); 
Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding utility on basis of in 
vitro demonstration of the claimed biological activity, that is, preventing aggregation 
of platelets); see also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that 
“proof of an alleged pharmaceutical property for a compound by statistically significant 
tests with standard experimental animals is sufficient to establish utility” and stating 
court’s “firm conviction that one who has taught the public that a compound exhibits 
some desirable pharmaceutical property in a standard experimental animal has made a 
significant and useful contribution to the art, even though it may eventually appear that 
the compound is without value in the treatment in humans” (quoting In re Krimmel, 
292 F.2d 948, 953 (C.C.P.A. 1961)); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2107.03 (9th ed. 2017) (requiring evidence “that 
reasonably supports” pharmacological or therapeutic utility and noting that data from 
in vitro or animal testing “is generally sufficient”). 
 87. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2017). 
 88. Id.   
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.; see FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS at 
ADB31–ADB78 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentAp-
provalProcess/UCM071436.pdf [hereinafter APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS] (describing 
various use patents). 
 91. § 314.53(b); see generally JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 
38–46 (2005) (listing numerous types of pharmaceutical patent claims). 
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Through the 1970s, as the modern new drug premarket paradigm took 
shape, scholars and policymakers became aware of diminishing effective pa-
tent life.  Because inventors typically file active ingredient patent applications 
before clinical testing starts, these patents tend to issue before or during the 
trials.  At the time, a patent lasted for seventeen years from issuance.92  Today, 
it generally lasts for twenty years from the filing of the patent application.93  In 
either case, a significant portion of the term of an active ingredient patent may 
lapse before FDA approves the marketing application.  This shortens the period 
of time that the drug sponsor may exploit the invention in the market while 
enjoying patent rights.  Numerous studies in the 1970s and early 1980s docu-
mented a significant decline in the effective patent life of new drugs over the 
preceding decades.94  Other studies pointed out that the length of the premarket 
process had increased substantially,95 and still others documented a decline in 
the rate of new drug introductions.96  Some studies linked the decline in new 
drug introductions to increased regulatory requirements.97  Others suggested 
 
 92. 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (1984). 
 93. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (West 2018).  Congress changed the term in the Uru-
guay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), to imple-
ment the Marrakesh Agreement of 1994, part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
negotiations that transformed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade into the 
World Trade Organization.  For patents issued on or after June 8, 1995, the term is 
twenty years from the patent application or, if the application contains a specific refer-
ence to an earlier filed application, twenty years from the date of that application.  § 
154 (a)(2).  Patents in force on June 8, 1995, or that issued on applications pending on 
that date, lasted either twenty years from application or seventeen years from issuance, 
whichever ended later.  Id. § 154(c)(1). 
 94. See Schifrin, supra note 51, at 116–19 (surveying literature on decline in ef-
fective patent life by 1982); Peter Barton Hutt, The Importance of Patent Term Resto-
ration to Pharmaceutical Innovation, 1 HEALTH AFF. 6, 16–17 (1982) (noting that 
“[t]he effective patent life of the NCE drugs approved by FDA in 1980 and 1981 was 
less than half the seventeen years provided by Congress” and listing studies to date). 
 95. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON SCI., RESEARCH AND TECH., 96TH CONG., THE FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION’S PROCESS FOR APPROVING NEW DRUGS 81 (Comm. Print 
1980) (finding it took four to six years on average to conduct clinical testing for ap-
proval); Martin Eisman & William Wardell, The Decline in Effective Patent Life of New 
Drugs, 24 RES. MGMT. 18, 19 (1981) (showing increase in clinical testing period from 
5.9 years in 1968 to 8.3 years in 1979); Lewis H. Sarett, FDA Regulations and Their 
Influence on Future R&D, 17 RES. MGMT. 18, 18 (1974) (reporting that average product 
development time had increased from two years in 1958–62 to 5.5–8 years in 1968–
72). 
 96. See Schifrin, supra note 51, at 93 (noting that comparisons of rates of intro-
duction before 1962 and after 1962 generally showed decline in the 1960s and 1970s).  
In fact, new molecular entities had entered the market at a rate of nearly twenty per year 
in the 1950s, and the pace dropped to fifteen or below in the 1960s and 1970s.  Michael 
S. Kinch et al., An Overview of FDA-Approved New Molecular Entities: 1827–2013, 
19 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 1033, 1034 fig.1 (2014). 
 97. One influential study compared the actual flow of new chemical entities from 
1962 to 1969 with the flow predicted from a regression of the determinants of the flow 
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that drug researchers had finished the easy work and that the challenges of de-
veloping treatments for chronic diseases were harder and more time consum-
ing.98  Still others noted that the explanations were not mutually exclusive.99 
Together these studies informed enactment of section 156 of the Patent 
Act in 1984.100  Section 156 allows the PTO to restore a portion of the term of 
one patent associated with a product that underwent regulatory review prior to 
commercial marketing.101  Restoration of the patent is subject to numerous con-
ditions, the most significant of which is that the regulatory review must result 
in the first permitted commercial marketing or use of the active ingredient in 
question.102  Also PTO will not restore any portion of the regulatory review 
period that occurred prior to patent issuance.103 
Patent protection for new drugs remains paradoxical, however, because 
the statutory formula limits the number of days recoverable.  Although it di-
rects PTO to restore all of the patent term that lapses while FDA reviews a new 
drug application, it permits restoration of only half of the clinical testing pe-
riod.104  The clinical testing period begins when FDA authorizes clinical trials 
by permitting an IND to go into effect and ends when the applicant submits its 
 
prior to 1962.  SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE 
1962 AMENDMENTS 10 (1974).  This study showed that the actual flow in the 1960s was 
half of what had been predicted.  Id. 
 98. See, e.g., JOHN W. EGAN ET AL., ECONOMICS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY  104 (1982); see also Viviane Quirke, From Alkaloids to Gene Therapy: A 
Brief History of Drug Discovery in the 20th Century, in MAKING MEDICINES 177, 197 
(Stuart Anderson ed., 2005)  (noting theories for the slowing pace by 1975, including 
both the post-1962 regulatory requirements and the possibility that early drug discov-
eries had been providential, while “purposeful search[es] . . . take[] much longer”). 
 99. One study attributed fifty percent of the U.S. lag to a worldwide depletion of 
research opportunities and fifty percent to U.S. regulatory policy, after comparing the 
rate and timing of new drug introductions in the United States with the rate and timing 
in other countries.  Henry G. Grabowski, Drug Regulation and Innovation: Empirical 
Evidence and Policy Options, 66 J. PHARM. SCI. 911 (1976). 
 100. Alan D. Lourie, Patent Term Restoration, 66 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 526, 535–36 
(1984) (providing history of the patent term restoration provisions of 1984); see gener-
ally Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the 
Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187 (1999) (providing history of the 
1984 statute). 
 101. In addition to new (human) drugs, patent term restoration is available for new 
animal drugs, human and veterinary biological products, food additives, color addi-
tives, and medical devices.  35 U.S.C.A. § 156 (West 2018).  Veterinary biological 
products are regulated by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) 
within USDA.  See 9 C.F.R. § 124.1 (2017).  FDA regulates the other products.  What 
Does FDA Regulate?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194879.htm (last updated 
Dec. 19, 2017). 
 102. 35 U.S.C.A. § 156(a)(5)(A) (West 2018). 
 103. Id. § 156(c). 
 104. Id. § 156(c)(2). 
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NDA.105  Thus, if the drug spent 1000 days in clinical trials, PTO will restore 
only 500 days.106  Put another way, there is a fifty percent penalty for clinical 
testing.  Moreover, PTO awards no more than five years.107  Once the approval 
period and half of the testing period are added, the final number will be rounded 
down (if necessary) so that the new patent expiry date is no more than five 
years after the original expiry date.108  Thus past a certain point in a research 
program, every additional day of testing translates to a lost day of patent life.109  
The paradox remains: the exclusive marketing period made possible by the pa-
tent is shorter for drugs with longer research programs. 
B.  Data Exclusivity 
The period for exclusive marketing also derives from data exclusivity, 
which is separate from patent exclusivity.  In addition to adding section 156 to 
the Patent Act, the 1984 legislation created a statutory pathway for approval of 
generic drugs.  A generic drug application omits safety and effectiveness infor-
mation and instead relies on the research submitted by another applicant, with-
out that applicant’s permission.110  It is thus an “abbreviated” new drug appli-
cation.  Data exclusivity is inherent in any licensure scheme that requires the 
submission of data and that permits one company to rely on data in another 
company’s submission.  The rules must state when the later abbreviated appli-
cation is permitted.  Data exclusivity is unrelated to any patent protection the 
first company might have.111 
As a general rule, when FDA approves a new (never before approved) 
active ingredient, generic applications citing that active ingredient cannot be 
submitted for five years.112  This is known as “new chemical entity” (“NCE”) 
exclusivity, due to FDA’s particular way of interpreting the statutory phrase 
 
 105. Id. § 156(g)(1)(B)(i). 
 106. If the patent in question issued on the 400th day of the testing period, PTO will 
consider only the final 600 days and will restore only 300 days.  See, e.g., id. § 
156(c)(2). 
 107. Id. § 156(g)(6)(A). 
 108. The rule was different for a drug already in clinical trials when Congress en-
acted the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.  See id. § 156(g)(6)(A)–(C). 
 109. There is also a fourteen-year limit on the effective patent life.  Id. § 156(c)(3). 
 110. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2) (West 2018) (describing contents of ANDA); Lietzan, 
supra note 4, at 106 (explaining reliance). 
 111. There is confusion in the literature over the terminology, with some writers 
using “market exclusivity” to describe the period of time before generic applications 
may be submitted or approved.  See Lietzan, supra note 4, at 110–12 (discussing con-
fusion).  This Article uses “data exclusivity” to refer to the period of time during which 
the innovator has exclusive rights to the data it submitted.  Id. at 103. 
 112. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).  This is shortened to four years if the generic applicant chal-
lenges a patent claiming the innovator’s drug or a method of using that drug.  Id.  For 
a more detailed discussion of the nuances of data exclusivity, see generally Lietzan, 
supra note 4, at 134–50. 
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that mentions “active ingredient.”  The agency focuses on whether the “active 
moiety” – the molecule responsible for the physiological or pharmacological 
action of the drug – has been approved before.113  This is a narrower inquiry 
than whether the drug’s active ingredient is new for purposes of patent term 
restoration.114  Data exclusivity is not paradoxical in the way that patent exclu-
sivity is paradoxical.  It is, however, invariable.  No matter how much time and 
money a firm spends developing a new drug, its right to exclusive use of the 
data it generates expires five years after the new drug’s approval. 
IV.  DRUG INNOVATION AND PARADOX 
Once a patent application has been filed, any further time spent develop-
ing, testing, and refining a product before market launch results in a shorter 
effective patent life.115  This structural point is true regardless of the field of 
invention.  Inventors face a variety of pressures that could increase their time 
to market, ranging from prudential legal considerations (e.g., safety testing to 
guide modifications that reduce liability exposure) to business considerations 
(e.g., testing to guide modifications that optimize commercial appeal).  Gener-
ally the fact that increased time to market leads to decreased effective patent 
life should prompt efficient pre-launch behavior and may not raise public pol-
icy concerns. 
With new drugs, however, there may be cause for concern.  The design 
and length of any particular premarket program depend on the chemical struc-
ture of the active ingredient, its mechanism of action, the disease and its bio-
logical pathways, the disease state targeted, the outcome tested, and even the 
presence and nature of other treatments on the market.  The way these factors 
affect premarket timelines is largely beyond the sponsor’s control.  A drug’s 
sponsor has a different kind of control.  Within a range of options largely dic-
tated by the current state of scientific knowledge and by FDA regulatory re-
quirements and culture, a company has choices about the disease and disease 
stage to pursue and the outcomes or uses to investigate.  It also has the choice 
 
 113. See Lietzan, supra note 4, at 135–36; 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (2017). 
 114. The standard for patent term restoration is whether the active ingredient, or a 
salt or ester thereof, has previously been approved.  § 156.  It is more forgiving, which 
means that some new drugs receive patent term restoration but not NCE exclusivity.  
See, e.g., Photocure ASA v. Kappos, 603 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (rejecting 
use of FDA “active moiety” approach and finding that methyl aminolevulinate hydro-
chloride was entitled to restoration, even though it was a methyl ester of the previously 
approved aminolevulinate hydrochloride and therefore would not receive NCE status 
at FDA). 
 115. When the patent term was measured from patent issuance, time spent devel-
oping, testing, and refining the product after issuance (and before market launch) re-
sulted in a shorter effective patent life.  Now that the patent term is measured from the 
patent application, it is time after the application (and before market launch) that results 
in shorter effective patent life. 
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss1/6
2018] THE DRUG INNOVATION PARADOX 63 
whether to continue with a project or examine another compound entirely.  Ra-
ther than choices relating to the efficiency of a particular premarket process, 
these are choices about the research goals – meaning a program’s overall ob-
jectives and a trial’s hypothesis – and therefore the type of product it will pur-
sue.  Rather than steering drug firms towards efficient premarket behavior, the 
paradoxical effective patent life and flat data exclusivity period may steer them 
away from particular fields altogether. 
A.  Trial Design, Efficacy Endpoints, and Scope of Approval 
A modern drug development program culminates in adequate and well-
controlled phase 3 trials designed to generate substantial evidence of effective-
ness.116  The “endpoint” used in those trials has a profound influence on the 
length of the trials and therefore the overall clinical program.  As explained in 
Part II.D., the research results dictate the content of the labeling and therefore 
the scope of approval.  This means the endpoints acceptable to FDA in any 
particular situation will define the product that can be approved, and a firm’s 
selection of one endpoint among choices (if there are any) is tantamount to 
selection of the product to be pursued.  In the end, certain products will require 
phase 3 effectiveness endpoints that necessitate longer trials, triggering the in-
novation paradox. 
1.  Traditional Endpoints 
The endpoint of a trial is a variable intended to reflect a desired outcome 
that can be statistically analyzed to answer a research question.117  The basic 
goal in endpoint selection is identification of a variable that will – if measured 
as described in the protocol and assessed as specified in the data analysis plan, 
and assuming positive results – support regulatory approval.  As a practical 
matter, the results generally must demonstrate diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
 
 116. It is possible to obtain approval on the basis of one adequate and well-con-
trolled trial.  FDA approved the first HIV/AIDS drug, Retrovir (zidovudine), on the 
basis of data from a single randomized trial – which some characterize as a phase 2 trial 
– that was stopped on ethical grounds when the therapeutic value became clear.  
CARPENTER, supra note 30, at 436; see generally id. at 428–57 (discussing in detail 
FDA’s development of accelerated approval and fast-track processes in connection 
with the AIDS crisis); see also CLINICAL EFFICACY GUIDANCE, supra note 56, at 3 (not-
ing history of approvals on the basis of a single trial); Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–115, § 115, 111 Stat. 2296, 2312 (1997) 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)) (clarifying that FDA may rely on data from one ade-
quate and well-controlled trial plus “confirmatory” evidence). 
 117. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. & NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, BEST (BIOMARKERS, 
ENDPOINTS, AND OTHER TOOLS) RESOURCE 51 (Nov. 14, 2017). 
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treatment, or prevention of disease.118  As a result, the trial protocol customar-
ily specifies an endpoint that directly measures how the patient feels, functions, 
or survives or an endpoint that represents or characterizes the clinical outcome 
of interest, such as disease exacerbation or a clinical event like a stroke.119  
Upon review of the resulting data, FDA approves the drug for a particular use, 
and it approves the precise wording of the labeling that describes the conditions 
of this use.120  The use, and this wording, in turn depend on the clinical trial 
design, including the endpoints, as well as the statistical analysis of the result-
ing data.  To give a concrete example, FDA does not approve a new drug for 
Alzheimer’s disease in some general sense.  Instead, it approved Exelon (ri-
vastigmine tartrate) for “treatment of mild to moderate dementia of the Alz-
heimer’s type,” after Novartis provided the results from double-blinded, ran-
domized, placebo-controlled trials in patients with mild to moderate demen-
tia.121  The endpoint in those trials, in turn, was the drug’s ability to improve 
cognitive performance, using parameters like concentration, memory, orienta-
tion (as to date, for instance), word recognition, and word finding.122  Clinical 
trial design always shapes the scope of approval, meaning the wording that 
describes the approved use and expected outcomes. 
The customary clinical endpoint for a drug that treats a life-threatening 
condition is overall survival.123  Investigators generally follow each research 
 
 118. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(g)(1) (West 2018) (defining a drug as, among other things, 
an “article[] intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention 
of disease”); 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(2) (2017) (requiring Indications and Usage section 
of labeling to state that the drug is indicated “for the treatment, prevention, mitigation, 
cure, or diagnosis of a recognized disease or condition, or of a manifestation of a rec-
ognized disease or condition, or for the relief of symptoms associated with a recognized 
disease or condition”). 
 119. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS – DRUGS AND 
BIOLOGICS 17 (May 2014) [hereinafter EXPEDITED PROGRAMS GUIDANCE] (defining 
clinical endpoint as “a characteristic or variable that directly measures a therapeutic 
effect of a drug – an effect on how a patient feels (e.g., symptom relief), functions (e.g., 
improved mobility), or survives”). 
 120. See supra Part II.D. 
      121. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NDA 
20-823, STATISTICAL REVIEW(S) (Nov. 30, 1997), https://www.ac-
cessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2000/20823_Exelon_statr_P1.pdf [hereinafter 
EXELON EFFICACY]; Exelon Package Insert (2000). 
 122. Cognitive performance was measured using the cognitive subscale of the Alz-
heimer’s Disease Assessment Scale (ADAS-cog) and overall clinical effect was as-
sessed using a Clinician’s Interview Based Impression of Change with caregiver infor-
mation (CIBIC-Plus).   EXELON EFFICACY, supra note 121. 
 123. See TOM BRODY, CLINICAL TRIALS: STUDY DESIGN, ENDPOINTS AND 
BIOMARKERS, DRUG SAFETY, AND FDA AND ICH GUIDELINES 191 (2012).  Alternative 
endpoints might be death itself or (depending on the drug and goal of the program) a 
relevant clinical event such as recurrent heart attack or stroke. 
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subject from randomization to the time that death occurs from any cause.124  
The statistical analysis basically compares the survival times in the treatment 
group with the survival times in the control group.125  One significant challenge 
with overall survival analysis for drug sponsors is that it requires larger and 
longer trials than other endpoints would.126  To begin with, if the disease has a 
long course until death (prostate cancer, for instance, instead of pancreatic can-
cer), an overall survival analysis may require a longer period of follow-up with 
subjects.127  Also, overall survival may require a larger sample size – more trial 
subjects – to achieve statistical significance.128  This is particularly true if the 
sponsor anticipates a small incremental increase in survival time, that is, a 
small effect size.129  A larger sample size will, in turn, generally lengthen the 
trial.  This is because most phase 3 trials enroll subjects on a rolling basis.130  
That is, subjects enroll one by one as they volunteer and are found to meet the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria.131  Thus, a trial that requires more subjects to 
achieve statistical significance with a selected endpoint can take longer to en-
roll and complete, and this can be exacerbated if disease prevalence or the 
trial’s inclusion criteria limit the pool of potential volunteers in the first in-
stance. 
 
 124. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: CLINICAL TRIAL ENDPOINTS FOR THE APPROVAL OF CANCER DRUGS 
AND BIOLOGICS 5 (May 2007), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guid-
ances/ucm071590.pdf [hereinafter CANCER ENDPOINTS GUIDANCE]. 
 125. Id. at 6.  As a practical matter, the protocol must specify a cut-off date for final 
data analysis, with the understanding that some subjects may not have experienced 
death yet.  For these subjects, the data reflect minimum survival time rather than true 
survival time.  See Taane Clark et al., Survival Analysis Part I: Basic Concepts and 
First Analyses, 89 BRIT. J. CANCER 89 (2003). 
 126. See CANCER ENDPOINTS GUIDANCE, supra note 124, at 4; BRODY, supra note 
123, at 191. 
 127. BRODY, supra note 123, at 216; e.g., Carolyn Compton, Cancer Survival Anal-
ysis 28–29, in AJCC CANCER STAGING ATLAS (Carolyn Compton et al. eds., 2012) (“In 
diseases with a long natural history, the duration of study could be 5–20 years, and 
survival intervals of 6–12 months will provide a meaningful description of the survival 
dynamics.  If the population being studied has a very poor prognosis (e.g., patients with 
carcinoma of the esophagus or pancreas) the total duration of study may be 2–3 years, 
and the survival intervals may be described in terms of 1–3 months.”). 
 128. Ross L. Prentice, Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical Trials: Definition and Op-
erational Criteria, 8 STAT. MED. 431 (1989). 
 129. Martin Abeloff, Biostatistics and Bioinformatics in Clinical Trials, in 
ABELOFF’S CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 309, 311 (Martin D. Abeloff et al. eds., 4th ed. 2008) 
(“A small study will have low power to detect small differences.”). 
 130. BRODY, supra note 123, at 122. 
 131. See id. 
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2.  Surrogate Endpoints 
Use of a surrogate endpoint can shorten the duration of a trial, particularly 
a trial that requires an overall survival analysis or another potentially distant 
endpoint like death, heart attack, or stroke.132  A surrogate endpoint is a meas-
urement used to predict a clinical benefit but does not establish a clinical effect 
in itself.133  Surrogate endpoints include laboratory measurements (such as vi-
ral loads or counts of certain blood cell types) and measurements obtained 
through MRI or other imaging technology.134  A surrogate endpoint can shorten 
a trial’s duration because it can usually be measured earlier in time for each 
subject in the trial.135  A trial with a surrogate endpoint generally also requires 
fewer study subjects to achieve statistical significance, shortening the period 
from the first patient’s first visit to the last patient’s last visit.136  A biostatistics 
team from the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) illustrated both advantages 
in 1989: an antihypertensive drug would require 25,000 subjects for five years 
if the stroke endpoint were used, but the surrogate of maintenance of a blood 
pressure drop permits a trial in 200 subjects for a year or two.137  Surrogate 
endpoints thus have the potential to mitigate some of the problem faced by 
companies considering development of drugs that would otherwise require 
very long trials due to the clinical endpoints needed. 
Surrogate endpoints can be further divided into validated surrogate end-
points and novel (not yet validated) surrogate endpoints.138  Validated surro-
gate endpoints are known to predict clinical benefit.139  Prior to validation, a 
surrogate endpoint is merely thought to be predictive.140  There has been in-
creased interest in use of novel surrogate endpoints since the early 1980s,141 
 
 132. Prentice, supra note 128, at 431 (“A primary motivation for the use of a sur-
rogate endpoint . . . concerns the possible reduction in sample size or trial duration that 
we can expect when a rare or distal endpoint is replaced by a more frequent or proxi-
mate endpoint.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 133. FDA CRITICAL PATH REPORT, supra note 85, at R-9, R-11. 
 134. Abeloff, supra note 129. 
 135. Id. at 324; see also FDA CRITICAL PATH REPORT, supra note 85, at R-11 (“In 
disorders where the clinical endpoint is hard to assess (e.g., joint deterioration in rheu-
matoid arthritis) or takes a long time to occur (e.g., certain preventive therapies), use of 
a qualified surrogate endpoint can markedly accelerate the development process for 
treatment breakthroughs.”). 
 136. Prentice, supra note 128, at 431. 
 137. Janet Wittes et al., Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical Trials: Cardiovascular 
Diseases, 8 STAT. MED. 415, 417 (1989). 
 138. Thomas R. Fleming & John H. Powers, Biomarkers and Surrogate Endpoints 
in Clinical Trials, 31 STAT. MED. 2973, 2975 (2012). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See generally id.; see also Thomas R. Fleming & David L. DeMets, Surrogate 
End Points in Clinical Trials: Are We Being Misled?, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 605 
(1996). 
 141. FDA CRITICAL PATH REPORT, supra note 85, at R-9, R-11. 
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but there are also concerns.  First, the disease of interest could affect the bi-
omarker and the clinical endpoint separately, that is, on different biological 
pathways.142  In this case, a change in the biomarker would not predict a change 
in clinical outcome.143  The opposite could also be true: the treatment could 
have no effect on the biomarker but a meaningful effect on the clinical outcome 
of interest, in which case the clinical benefit would be missed.144  Second, the 
disease process could achieve the clinical outcome, or increase the risk of the 
clinical outcome, through multiple biological pathways, and the biomarker 
might lie on only one pathway.145  In this case, too, a change in the biomarker 
might not predict a change in clinical outcome.146  Confirmation of a particular 
drug’s clinical benefit thus does not in itself validate – for other drugs – the 
surrogate endpoint used in its initial approval.147  Third, the drug could have a 
separate, not previously appreciated, mechanism of action that is independent 
of its effect on the disease process and, perhaps, undesirable; this is sometimes 
called an off-target effect.148 
These concerns are not hypothetical.  For instance, a difference in re-
sponse rate without a difference in survival has been noted in both non-small-
cell lung cancer and squamous cell carcinoma of the head and neck.149  In con-
trast, patients with colorectal cancer sometimes receive a meaningful survival 
benefit without showing a comparably meaningful objective response.150  And 
 
 142. Thomas R. Fleming, Surrogate Endpoints and FDA’s Accelerated Approval 
Process, 24 HEALTH AFF. 67, 69 (2005). 
 143. Id. 
 144. FDA, E9 GUIDANCE, supra note 58, at 9; Temple, supra note 33, at 1655 (not-
ing possibility “that the presumed relation of a surrogate to a clinical end-point may not 
exist”). 
 145. Fleming, supra note 142, at 69–70. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 71–72 (discussing how to validate and explaining that post-approval con-
firmation of clinical benefit does not necessarily validate the surrogate, and validation 
for one pharmacologic class does not validate for all); cf. FDA, E9 GUIDANCE, supra 
note 58, at 9 (noting that relationship between surrogate and clinical endpoints “for one 
product do not necessarily apply to a product with a different mode of action for treating 
the same disease”). 
 148. Fleming, supra note 142, at 70; Temple, supra note 33, at 1655 (noting possi-
bility “that the surrogate end-point only measures what is thought to be the good effect 
of a drug . . . but ignores potential adverse effects that may be rarer . . . but can under-
mine a beneficial effect”).  Surrogate endpoints also present a statistical challenge; pa-
tients may fail to return for follow-up, leading to missing data.  The overall survival 
endpoint does not present this challenge, because vital status can always be determined. 
Wittes et al., supra note 137, at 419. 
 149. Susan S. Ellenberg & J. Michael Hamilton, Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical 
Trials: Cancer, 8 STAT. MED. 405, 408 (1989) (citing these and other studies in which 
differences in tumor response did not correlate with differences in survival time). 
 150. See, e.g., Axel Grothey et al., Response-Independent Survival Benefit in Met-
astatic Colorectal Cancer: A Comparative Analysis of N9741 and AVF2107, 26 J. 
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 183, 183 (2008) (finding that objective response did not predict 
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it was incorrectly assumed that reducing the incidence of ventricular premature 
beats (surrogate endpoint) in patients after myocardial infarction would im-
prove their survival (clinical endpoint).151  A three-year study of the anti-
arrhythmic drugs Enkaid (encainide) and Tambocor (flecainide) in nearly 2000 
patients found the opposite; possibly due to an off-target effect, the drugs in-
creased mortality.152 
FDA has therefore been cautious with respect to novel surrogate end-
points.  Although the agency initially approved some cancer drugs on the basis 
of objective response, usually tumor shrinkage, by the mid-1980s it was ex-
pressing concern about the clinical relevance of these findings.153  The 
agency’s hesitation pushed drug researchers towards the less risky approach of 
studying overall survival.154  This led to a clash with the National Cancer In-
stitute, the head of which complained that “having to do survival data” was 
“another way of denying access” to cancer drugs.155  FDA yielded in March 
1989, approving Paraplatin (carboplatin), a second generation platinum-based 
chemotherapy agent, on the basis of objective response.156  The drug had been 
developed as a replacement for Platinol (cisplatin), which was one of the most 
 
the magnitude of survival benefit from the superior therapy and concluding that “tumor 
response in metastatic colorectal cancer is not a necessary factor for a therapy to pro-
vide benefit to an individual patient”). 
 151. Temple, supra note 33, at 1655; Hampton, supra note 37, at 558. 
 152. The Cardiac Arrhythmia Suppression Trial (CAST) Investigators, Preliminary 
Report: Effect of Encainide and Flecainide on Mortality in a Randomized Trial of Ar-
rhythmia Suppression After Myocardial Infarction, 321 NEJM 406 (1989). 
 153. Richard Pazdur, Endpoints for Assessing Drug Activity in Clinical Trials, 13 
ONCOLOGIST 19, 19–21 (2008) (noting that in the 1970s FDA used objective overall 
response, i.e., tumor assessment, and then shifted to direct evidence of clinical benefit, 
i.e., overall survival, health-related quality of life, tumor-related symptoms, and phys-
ical function).  Dr. Pazdur was the director of FDA’s Division of Oncology Drug Prod-
ucts from 1999 to 2005 and the director of the Office of Hematology and Oncology 
Products from 2005 to 2017; he is now director of FDA’s Oncology Center of Excel-
lence. 
 154. See CARPENTER, supra note 30, at 574. 
 155. Id. at 574–75; see also Phase II Cancer Drug Clinical Trials Showing Anti-
tumor Effect Should Be Sufficient Basis for Approval; National Cancer Institute’s 
Bruce Chabner, PINK SHEET (Jan. 9, 1989) [hereinafter Phase II Cancer Drug Clinical 
Trials] (noting “ongoing argument” between FDA and NCI over approval criteria for 
anticancer agents, and quoting NCI Division of Cancer Treatment Director that a 
“demonstration of partial or complete responses in a significant fraction, perhaps 20%, 
of patients with stages or types of cancer refractory to standard therapy should be suf-
ficient for approval”). 
 156. Paraplatin Package Insert (1990) (“In two randomized controlled trials in pa-
tients with advanced ovarian cancer previously treated with chemotherapy, Paraplatin 
achieved six clinical complete responses in 47 patients.  The duration of these responses 
ranged from 45 to 71+ weeks.”); see also CARPENTER, supra, note 30, at 575. 
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significant breakthroughs in cancer therapy, but was also highly toxic.157  Be-
cause Platinol was available, however, FDA would approve Paraplatin only as 
a second-line treatment for advanced ovarian cancer, meaning for patients ex-
periencing a relapse after treatment with another medicine.158  The agency 
would not approve the drug for first-line treatment until July 1991, when Bris-
tol-Myers Squibb had data from an overall survival endpoint and a time-to-
progression endpoint.159  FDA then adopted regulations describing approval on 
the basis of novel surrogate endpoints.  These “subpart H” regulations permit 
“accelerated” approval of a new drug for a serious or life-threatening condition 
on the basis of a surrogate endpoint “reasonably likely to predict clinical ben-
efit” or a clinical endpoint other than survival (also known as an “interim” or 
“intermediate” endpoint).160  The applicant must study, verify, and describe the 
clinical benefit after approval.  Congress later codified accelerated approval.161 
Despite the creation of an accelerated approval pathway, FDA remains 
conservative.  Medical reviewers as well as officials responsible for medical 
policy continue to prefer two randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blinded 
clinical trials, showing a statistically significant difference in measurement of 
a clinical endpoint.162  From 2010 to 2014, less than a quarter of the drugs and 
 
 157. See Discovering Early Chemotherapy Drugs, INST. CANCER RES., 
https://www.icr.ac.uk/about-us/our-achievements/our-scientific-discoveries/we-dis-
covered-chemotherapeutic-agents-which-are-still-in-use-more-than-50-years-later 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2018). 
 158. Paraplatin Package Insert, supra note 156 (“Paraplatin is indicated for the pal-
liative treatment of patients with ovarian carcinoma recurrent after prior chemotherapy, 
including patients who have been previously treated with cisplatin.”); see also Bristol-
Myers’ Paraplatin (Carboplatin) for Ovarian Cancer Recommended for Approval as 
Second-Line Therapy in Relapsed Patients by FDA Advisory Committee, PINK SHEET 
(Jan. 2, 1989).  Dr. Temple explained in 1991 that because Platinol was known to im-
prove survival, the agency’s advisors “felt that it was appropriate that the data be mature 
enough to conclude that the use of carboplatin would not be associated with worse sur-
vival.”  Bristol-Myers Squibb’s Paraplatin (Carboplatin) Data Support First-Line 
Ovarian Cancer Indication Despite Survival Profile Concerns, FDA Finds, PINK SHEET 
(July 8, 1991). 
 159. The revised labeling stated that Paraplatin had demonstrated an “equivalent 
overall survival rate compared to cisplatin when both were given in combination with 
cyclophosphamide.”  Bristol-Myers Squibb’s Paraplatin (Carboplatin) Data Support 
First-Line Ovarian Cancer Indication Despite Survival Profile Concerns, FDA Finds, 
supra note 158. 
 160. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.500–314.560 (2017). 
 161. 21 U.S.C.A. § 356(c)(2)(A) (West 2018); 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d) (West 2018). 
 162. E.g., Joseph W. Cormier, Advancing FDA’s Regulatory Science Through 
Weight of Evidence Evaluations, 28 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2011); Mir-
iam E. Tucker, FDA Panel Reviews Nitroglycerin for Anal Fissure: Opinion Was Di-
vided on Whether Three Phase III Trials Demonstrated a “Clinically Meaningful” Ef-
fect, INTERNAL MED. NEWS (June 1, 2006), https://www.thefreeli-
brary.com/FDA+panel+reviews+nitroglycerin+for+anal+fissure%3a+opinion+was+di
vided...-a0147354087 (quoting Dr. Temple that substantial evidence generally requires 
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biologics approved on the basis of surrogate endpoints (eighteen of the eighty-
four) relied on novel surrogate endpoints.163  The rest used well-established 
surrogates, like hemoglobin A1C for type 2 diabetes and bone marrow density 
for osteoporosis.164  In the twenty-four years since FDA published its acceler-
ated approval regulations, the agency has approved only nineteen non-cancer, 
non-HIV drugs on the basis of a novel surrogate or interim endpoint.165 
3.  Scope of Approval 
Use of a surrogate endpoint is meant to shorten time to market and should 
have benefits in effective patent life.  Paraplatin illustrates this.  The shortened 
clinical period for Paraplatin took just over three and a half years.  At approval, 
the drug had roughly seven years of effective life remaining on U.S. Patent No. 
4,140,707, which became 9.5 years after patent term restoration.  If the com-
pany had waited another twenty-four months for approval with overall survival 
data, it would have had only five years of effective patent life left, which would 
have become 8.5 years after patent term restoration.166  Thus, using a clinical 
endpoint instead of a surrogate endpoint would have cost the company a year 
of effective patent life, meaning a year of exclusive sales before generic market 
entry.167  And it would have extended the premarket research and development 
period, with no corresponding increase in the data exclusivity period after ap-
proval.  This product, though, could have been labeled for first-line treatment.  
Using the surrogate endpoint and accepting the more limited labeling was pre-
sumably the rational choice for Bristol-Myers.  After all, it provided a revenue 
stream from the second-line treatment during the clinical outcomes trial, and it 
resulted in an additional year of effective patent life.  It may also have been the 
 
“at least one study showing a very large effect, or two studies for which the P value is 
less than .05”). 
 163. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NOVEL 
DRUGS APPROVED USING SURROGATE ENDPOINTS (2015), https://www.fda.gov/down-
loads/NewsEvents/Testimony/UCM445375.pdf [hereinafter NOVEL DRUGS]. 
 164. Id.  None of the ninety-one new molecular entities approved for treatment of 
rare diseases between 2009 and 2014 were approved on the basis of a novel surrogate 
endpoint.  Emil D. Kakkis et al., Accessing the Accelerated Approval Pathway for Rare 
Disease Therapeutics, 34 NATURE BIOTECH. 380, 380 (2016). 
 165. Frank J. Sasinowski & Alexander J. Varond, FDA’s Flexibility in Subpart H 
Approvals: Assessing Quantum of Effectiveness Evidence, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 135, 
139 (2016). 
 166. 35 U.S.C.A. § 156(c)(2) (West 2018).  Two more years in trials would have 
cost it two years of effective patent life, but only one of those years would have been 
recoverable.  Id. 
 167. Once approved, generic drugs will capture most of the market.  Henry 
Grabowski et al., Recent Trends in Brand-Name and Generic Drug Competition, 17 J. 
MED. ECON. 207, 212 (2013) (finding that the average new molecular entities experi-
encing initial generic entry in 2011 and 2012 retained only sixteen percent of the market 
after one year).  The revenue from an additional year of exclusivity before this generic 
penetration will vary with the product. 
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socially desirable outcome because it made a less toxic alternative to Platinol 
available sooner to physicians and patients. 
The surrogate endpoint is not, however, simply a shorter pathway to mar-
ket.  This is because FDA does not approve active ingredients alone.  It ap-
proves a finished product, its intended use, and the words that describe that use.  
When the agency approves a product on the basis of a surrogate endpoint, the 
product generally receives a limited indication.  Physicians and patients receive 
access to a prepared medicine containing the new active ingredient, and they 
may well have an inkling – or even a very good idea – of the hoped-for full 
indication.  But the new product that has been approved is, from a regulatory 
perspective, a different product.  Physicians will not have full instructions for 
the unapproved use, the company will be circumscribed in its ability to discuss 
what it knows about the unapproved use, and insurers may not cover the drug 
for unapproved use.  Thus although the company may commercialize during 
this portion of the patent term, much of the regulatory impediment to fully ex-
ploiting the patent remains in place.168  The narrow indication for Paraplatin 
put the drug in the middle of a debate about off-label prescribing, reimburse-
ment for unapproved uses, and promotion of unapproved uses.169 
The innovation paradox is that longer research programs lead to lesser 
rewards for innovation.  In cases like Paraplatin, the paradox may be accepta-
ble.  In theory, the company had two choices with respect to its product: a sur-
rogate endpoint and limited indication early, or a clinical endpoint and full in-
dication later.  We may want to steer companies facing this type of choice to-
wards use of the surrogate endpoint, although if this is desirable because we 
assume oncologists will use the product for first-line treatment anyway, requir-
ing the survival endpoint for the first-line labeling is something of a sham. 
In some cases, however, the choice between a surrogate and clinical end-
point is not available, and here the innovation paradox may be unacceptable.  
Sometimes a firm may have only the choice to proceed through a long track, 
on the one hand, or abandon the compound for another, on the other hand.  This 
is true even in oncology; the availability of a surrogate or interim endpoint 
depends largely on the type of cancer, the drug’s mechanism of action, and the 
 
 168. This is why suggestions that companies adopt premarket strategies with longer 
timelines in order to position the resulting product more competitively in the market-
place do not ring true.  See Harold E. Glass et al., Are Phase 3 Clinical Trials Really 
Becoming More Complex?, 49 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 852, 857 (2015) 
(hypothesizing that increase in per-patient duration in clinical trials results in part from 
wanting to make comparative efficacy or cost-effectiveness claims).  The history of 
new drug approvals is replete with examples of products approved on the basis of nar-
row indications, only to be expanded later to more competitively beneficial labeling as 
more robust data became available.  This is true not only of drugs subject to accelerated 
approval, for instance, but also products like Jardiance, discussed infra note 201. 
 169. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFF-LABEL DRUGS: REIMBURSEMENT 
POLICIES CONSTRAIN PHYSICIANS IN THEIR CHOICE OF CANCER THERAPIES 32–33 (Sept. 
1991), https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/151121.pdf. 
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availability of other treatments – considerations outside the sponsor’s con-
trol.170  As to type of cancer: as noted objective response rate does not always 
predict overall survival in metastatic colon cancer.171  Meta-analyses suggest 
progression-free survival correlates moderately well with overall survival in 
metastatic colon cancer,172 though not in prostate cancer.173  As to mechanism 
of action: whether a drug is cytotoxic (kills cancer cells) or cytostatic (slows or 
stops the growth of cancer cells, without killing them) can affect whether ob-
jective response accurately predicts overall survival.174  To give another exam-
ple, immunotherapy drugs for cancer work by stimulating the immune system 
and do not directly affect tumors, and they sometimes prompt a mild flare (ap-
parent tumor growth) that is not actual disease progression.175  In these cases, 
short-term objective response would be misleading.  As to other treatments: 
just as the availability of Platinol meant that FDA expected overall survival 
data for Paraplatin, where there is no available therapy for the cancer and major 
tumor changes can be presumed due to the tested drug, FDA is open to objec-
tive response and possibly proceeding without a control.176 
In short, in some cases there may be no alternative to the overall survival 
endpoint.  For non-metastatic cancers, this may require a long follow-up period 
that triggers an intolerable innovation paradox, meaning that we will have to 
do without treatment.  For example, as one physician from Sloan-Kettering 
commented at a recent meeting convened at FDA’s behest at Duke’s Margolis 
Center for Health Policy, “[W]e are not going to have new drugs approved for 
myeloma if we don’t get [minimal residual disease] as an endpoint.”177 
So, too, with drugs to treat neurodegenerative disorders.  If a disease is 
characterized by progressive degradation of the nervous system over an ex-
tended period of time, proving that a drug modifies the disease or meaningfully 
changes its ultimate outcome may require an unacceptably long clinical trial – 
 
 170. When FDA accepted a surrogate endpoint for Paraplatin, it told the National 
Cancer Institute that endpoint decisions would be made on a tumor-by-tumor basis.  
Phase II Cancer Drug Clinical Trials, supra note 155; see also CARPENTER, supra note 
30, at 576–77;  see generally BRODY, supra note 123, at 197–263 (exploring advantages 
and disadvantages of differing oncology endpoints based on the disease and other con-
siderations); CANCER ENDPOINTS GUIDANCE, supra note 124, at 4–5 (table comparing 
options). 
 171. See generally Grothey et al., supra note 150. 
 172. Chiara Cremolini et al., Surrogate Endpoints in Second-Line Trials of Tar-
geted Agents in Metastatic Colorectal Cancer: A Literature-Based Systematic Review 
and Meta-Analysis, 49 CANCER RES. TREATMENT 834, 841 (2017). 
 173. Beth Sherrill et al., Review of Meta-Analyses Evaluating Surrogate Endpoints 
for Overall Survival in Oncology, 5 ONCOTARGETS & THERAPY 287, 292 (2012). 
 174. BRODY, supra note 123, at 210–11. 
 175. Sue Sutter, Cancer Immunotherapies Have FDA, Industry Looking for New 
Endpoints, PINK SHEET (Oct. 19, 2016). 
 176. CANCER ENDPOINTS GUIDANCE, supra note 124, at 3.  Historical controls are 
another possibility.  21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(v) (2017). 
 177. Sue Sutter, Cancer Trial Endpoints: Minimal Residual Disease Eyed as Sur-
rogate, PINK SHEET (Sept. 20, 2016). 
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particularly if the drug must be administered decades before death might be 
expected.  In the therapeutic category of central nervous system drugs there are 
very few surrogate endpoints to shorten the pathway and lead to a different 
scope of approval.  The innovation paradox may simply steer innovators to 
other drugs. 
Alzheimer’s disease provides a cautionary tale.  To date, FDA has ap-
proved only treatments for relief of the clinical symptoms.178  Additional treat-
ments might someday delay the onset of dementia or even modify the disease’s 
natural course by affecting its underlying pathophysiology.179  But new drugs 
for Alzheimer’s fail repeatedly in clinical trials.180  One study found a 99.6%  
failure rate in trials performed between 2002 and 2012.181  We still do not un-
derstand the causes of this disease, its genetic and molecular pathways, or why 
and how it progresses.182  There are no measurable biological characteristics 
(biomarkers) that diagnose the disease, predict or measure its progression, or 
identify successful drug targets.183  The amyloid hypothesis – that the neuro-
degeneration in Alzheimer’s disease is caused primarily by the deposit of am-
yloid beta plaques in brain tissue – is nearly twenty-five years old,184 but amy-
loid beta plaques have not proven to be a reliable biomarker.  In trial after trial, 
drugs that reduce these plaques have had no measurable clinical impact.185  The 
tau hypothesis holds that neurofibrillary tangles in the brain, mainly composed 
 
 178. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
TARGETED DRUG DEVELOPMENT: WHY ARE MANY DISEASES LAGGING BEHIND? 6 (July 
2015), https://www.fdanews.com/ext/resources/files/07-15/7-15-FDA-
Report.pdf?1519911049 [hereinafter TARGETED DRUG DEVELOPMENT]. 
 179. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY, ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE: DEVELOPING DRUGS FOR THE TREATMENT OF 
EARLY STAGE DISEASE 5 (Feb. 2013), https://isctm.org/public_access/FDAGuid-
ance_AD_Developing_Drugs_Early_Stage_Treatment.pdf [hereinafter ALZHEIMER’S 
GUIDANCE]. 
 180. See Erin McCallister, Diagnosing AD Trials: Why Diagnostics Are Key to the 
Development of AD Drugs, BIOCENTURY (Mar. 3, 2017, 8:31 PM), https://www.biocen-
tury.com/biocentury/product-development/2017-03-03/why-diagnostics-are-key-de-
velopment-ad-drugs. 
 181. Jeffrey L. Cummings et al., Alzheimer’s Disease Drug-Development Pipeline: 
Few Candidates, Frequent Failures, 6 ALZHEIMER’S RES. & THERAPY 37, 41 (2014). 
 182. TARGETED DRUG DEVELOPMENT, supra note 178, at 4. 
 183. Id.  Rare genetic forms of the disease are the exception.  Id. 
 184. See, e.g., John A. Hardy & Gerald A. Higgins, Alzheimer’s Disease: The Am-
yloid Cascade Hypothesis, 256 SCIENCE 184 (1992). 
 185. Cummings et al., supra note 181, at 43; see Nicholas Kozauer & Russell Katz, 
Regulatory Innovation and Drug Development for Early-State Alzheimer’s Disease, 
368 NEJM 1169, 1169–70 (2013); TARGETED DRUG DEVELOPMENT, supra note 178, at 
4; McCallister, supra note 180. 
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of the protein tau, are the primary causative factor, but the first anti-tau drug to 
reach phase 3 also failed to show any improvement in cognition.186 
One possibility is that treatments need to intervene earlier in the natural 
history of the disease.187  The problem is that Alzheimer’s disease progresses 
slowly, and showing delayed onset of dementia would require a time-to-event 
endpoint, comparable to oncology’s survival analysis.188  So the question be-
comes whether surrogate endpoints are available.  There are no validated sur-
rogates, leaving only the possibility of novel surrogates and limited labeling.  
In the preclinical stages of Alzheimer’s disease, although functional impair-
ment has not begun, there are subtle cognitive deficits.189  It is also possible to 
measure subtle cognitive improvements.  Moreover, these improvements are 
viewed as reasonably likely to predict delayed onset of dementia.190  As a result 
FDA will permit accelerated approval using improved cognitive benefit as a 
novel (not validated) surrogate marker for delayed onset of dementia, which 
will then be evaluated after approval.191  But there is no pathway for accelerated 
approval of a drug to modify the course of the disease itself.192  There is no 
reliable evidence that any biomarker is reasonably likely to predict a lasting 
effect on the disease course.  So accelerated approval is not an option.193 
If indeed trials for Alzheimer’s treatments need to begin early in the nat-
ural history of the disease, during the preclinical stages, the conundrum is 
clear.194  The paradoxical patent term and the flat exclusivity term may dis-
courage companies from investing in these treatments rather than in drugs for 
short-term use that can be studied quickly or drug classes and diseases with 
validated surrogate endpoints. 
 
 186. See Andrew Pollack, Alzheimer’s Drug LMTX Falters in Final Stage of Trials, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/business/alz-
heimers-drug-lmtx-trial.html?_r=0. 
 187. Kozauer & Katz, supra note 185, at 1169–70 (noting a “leading theory” that 
“attempts at intervention [are occurring] too late in the progression of disease”).  The 
authors are medical officers in FDA’s Division of Neurology Products. 
 188. ALZHEIMER’S GUIDANCE, supra note 179, at 2 (“The underlying anatomical 
and pathophysiologic changes in AD begin many years before clinical symptoms 
emerge.”); id. at 4 (“The use of a time-to-event survival analysis approach (e.g., time 
to a diagnosis of dementia) is a particularly appealing primary efficacy measure in clin-
ical trials in early AD.  For practical reasons, trials designed with this endpoint have 
been generally conducted in the stages of the illness nearest to the onset of dementia . . 
. .”). 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. at 5. 
 193. Id.; TARGETED DRUG DEVELOPMENT, supra note 178, at 4. 
 194. Another possibility, of course, is that we misunderstand the disease mecha-
nism altogether.  See McCallister, supra note 180 (noting that researchers are also con-
sidering neuroinflammation, vascular pathology, loss of protein homeostasis, and mi-
tochondrial dysfunction and noting the “lack of biomarkers for therapies with targets 
outside of amyloid and tau aggregation pathways”). 
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B.  Safety Testing Requirements 
In recent years, concerns about long-term drug safety have led to an in-
crease in premarket safety testing requirements for certain classes of drugs.  
Hostile congressional oversight and perennial funding problems (which leave 
the agency at the legislature’s mercy) have always motivated agency officials 
to avoid approval of drugs that turn out, with broader and uncontrolled clinical 
use, particularly long-term use, to have an unfavorable balance of risk and ben-
efit.195  A series of high profile drug withdrawals in the 1990s and early 2000s 
may have made avoiding these errors more salient.196  Although additional 
safety testing may reduce Type I errors, the concern from an innovation policy 
perspective is that it also delays the approval of drugs that turn out to have 
acceptable risk-benefit balances.  The new requirements affect certain types of 
drugs – those intended for long-term use – more than others.  For instance, after 
emerging long-term data suggested an elevated risk of heart attacks in patients 
treated with Avandia (rosiglitazone maleate) for type 2 diabetes, FDA decided 
that all sponsors of new diabetes treatments should conduct cardiovascular out-
comes safety trials, even if no safety signal emerged in preclinical or clinical 
testing.197  The requirement has now spread to new obesity drugs and may 
 
 195. Anna B. Laakmann, Collapsing the Distinction Between Experimentation and 
Treatment in the Regulation of New Drugs, 62 ALA. L. REV. 305, 320 (2011) (noting 
tendency to avoid “type 1” errors, meaning false positives, or approvals that should not 
have happened); Louis Lasagna, Congress, the FDA, and New Drug Development: Be-
fore and After 1962, 32 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 322, 335 (1989) (noting that FDA is 
usually hauled before Congress for drug safety problems and not for failure to approve 
products). 
 196. See Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Cost of New 
Drug Discovery and Development, 3 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 417, 419 (2004) 
(suggesting that a decline in submitted NDAs was attributable to increased testing re-
quirements following recalls in the 1990s).  The drugs in question were Redux (dex-
fenfluramine), Pondimin (fenfluramine), Posicor (mibefradil), and Duract (bromfenac) 
in 1997, followed by Rezulin (troglitazone) in 2000, and Vioxx (rofecoxib) in 2004 and 
Bextra (valdecoxib) in 2005.  The safety issues varied.  For instance, fenfluramine was 
associated with cardiac valvulopathy, while bromfenac was hepatotoxic.  See generally 
Ruowei Li et al., Dose-Effect of Fenfluramine Use on the Severity of Valvular Heart 
Disease Among Fen-phen Patients with Valvulopathy, 23 INT’L J. OBESITY 926 (1999); 
Robert J. Fontana et al., Acute Liver Failure Associated with Prolonged Use of Brom-
fenac Leading to Liver Transplantation, 5 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION & SURGERY 480 
(1999). 
 197. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DIABETES 
MELLITUS – EVALUATING CARDIOVASCULAR RISK IN NEW ANTIDIABETIC THERAPIES TO 
TREAT TYPE 2 DIABETES 3–4 (Dec. 2008), https://www.fda.gov/down-
loads/Drugs/Guidances/ucm071627.pdf; Kate Rawson & Michael McCaughan, CV 
Outcomes Trials in Diabetes: First Results Suggest “Goalpost” Model Here to Stay, 
PINK SHEET (May 11, 2015) (noting connection to Avandia); Mervyn Turner, Embrac-
ing Change: A Pharmaceutical Industry Guide to the 21st Century, in TRANSLATIONAL 
MEDICINE AND DRUG DISCOVERY 328, 329 (Bruce H. Littman & Rajesh Krishna eds., 
2011) (discussing requirement). 
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spread further.198  To give another example, FDA recently asked the sponsor 
of a new antibiotic, solithromycin, to conduct a 9000-patient liver safety study 
prior to approval.199  Whether the obligation to conduct long-term premarket 
safety studies will affect particular therapeutic categories or pharmacologic 
classes more than others remains to be seen. 
These new requirements will protect premarket timelines.  The primary 
goal in a cardiovascular outcomes safety trial, for instance, is to demonstrate 
no increased risk of cardiovascular events.  By design the trials are often “event 
driven” – meaning that the design requires waiting until a pre-specified number 
of specific cardiovascular events (such as death, myocardial infarction, or 
stroke) have occurred.  As a result, these trials can be larger and longer than 
other trials in the premarket clinical program – up to seven years in length, for 
instance, or involving as many as 16,000 patients.200  It may be possible to 
obtain approval while such a trial is ongoing, once sufficient interim data have 
accrued for a cardiovascular safety meta-analysis.201  But the additional testing 
 
 198. Cathy Dombrowski, CV Risk Assessment for All Obesity Drugs Seems Inevi-
table Pre-approval Requirement, PINK SHEET (Mar. 29, 2012); Donna Young, US FDA 
Panel Calls for Additional CV Studies for Weight-Loss Drugs, PINK SHEET (Mar. 30, 
2012); Michael McCaughan, The Inevitable Outcome: Diabetes Safety Model Expands 
to Weight Loss . . . and Beyond?, PINK SHEET (May 1, 2012). 
 199. Michael Cipriano, Cempra’s Solithera Draws FDA Complete Response Letter 
on Liver Risks, PINK SHEET (Dec. 29, 2016). 
 200. Boaz Hirshberg & Arie Katz, Cardiovascular Outcome Studies with Novel An-
tidiabetes Agents: Scientific and Operational Considerations, 36 DIABETES CARE 
S253, S254 (2013). 
 201. See, e.g., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN.,  NDA 204629, CROSS DISCIPLINE TEAM LEADER REVIEW (July 31, 2014), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsat-
fda_docs/nda/2014/204629Orig1s000CrossR.pdf (noting that clinical review of 
Jardiance (empagliflozin) presents cardiovascular safety analysis separately from main 
review, due to inclusion of interim data from ongoing trial and need to protect trial 
integrity by maintaining confidentiality); CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,  NDA 204629, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND 
BIOPHARMACEUTICS REVIEW(S) (July 18, 2014), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drug-
satfda_docs/nda/2014/204629Orig1s000ClinPharmR.pdf (omitting pages 166–179 in 
the public version).  Such a trial could also support a claim of superiority with respect 
to cardiovascular outcomes.  These studies use a non-inferiority design, intended to 
show that the new drug is not materially worse than the control.  A non-inferiority study 
that shows superiority to the active control can support a claim of superiority without 
statistical adjustment.  Cf. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: NON-INFERIORITY CLINICAL TRIALS TO ESTABLISH 
EFFECTIVENESS 18 (Nov. 2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guid-
ances/UCM202140.pdf; see also Sue Sutter, Can a Safety Study Support a Superiority 
Claim? Barely, US FDA Advisors Say, PINK SHEET (July 4, 2016) (describing FDA’s 
recommendation to increase enrollment rather than conduct a second study of Jardiance 
to support superiority claim and describing the protocol changes needed); Michael 
McCaughan, Diabetes Outcomes Trial Requirement Looks ‘Increasingly Wise’ – 
FDA’s Temple, PINK SHEET (Sept. 1, 2016) (noting Dr. Temple’s view that the trial 
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has delayed approval, and each year of this testing costs half a year of effective 
patent life.  In short, certain therapeutic categories associated with long-term 
use of medicines are now associated with a safety testing burden that could 
lengthen their time to market – with a direct cost in effective patent life – rela-
tive to other therapeutic categories. 
C.  Continuing Evolution in the Paradigm 
In recent years, as we have gained a better understanding of the molecular 
basis of pathological disease processes and the body’s response to drugs, the 
basic approach to drug discovery has evolved.202  Some hope this shift will 
reduce the number of failed drugs (the attrition rate) and shorten research and 
development timelines for successful drugs. 
The traditional approach was phenotypic, working from observable re-
sults.  It involved screening new compounds in animals to determine their phar-
macological effects and then, on the basis of inference from the animal models, 
planning and conducting a clinical program for a human drug.203  The new ap-
proach involves selection of a biological target – based on a greater understand-
ing of disease pathways, enzymes that play important roles in those pathways, 
and cell surface receptors that bind to molecules and change cell behavior – 
and screening chemical libraries for compounds that affect the target in ques-
tion.204  The new approach results in a larger group of candidate compounds 
and requires a strategy for sorting out the most promising from the others.205  
Typically, this means clinical pharmacology work: a small human trial to prove 
the compound’s mechanism of action, meaning its effect on the biological tar-
get of interest, not its effect on any particular disease or condition.206  Proof of 
mechanism is followed by clinical studies to determine whether the proof of 
mechanism translates to clinical effectiveness, meaning its ability to accom-
plish a particular outcome with respect to a particular disease or condition.207 
 
reported “decreased CV mortality” and a reduction in “serious heart failure” which are 
“potential claims that are novel for the class”). 
 202. Editorial, Looking Back on the Millennium in Medicine, 342 NEJM 42, 48 
(2000) (noting that “major advances in drug therapy could not occur until there was 
sufficient understanding of physiology and pathophysiology to permit rational identifi-
cation of targets for drugs”). 
 203. Bruce H. Littman, Translational Medicine: Definition, History, and Strate-
gies, in TRANSLATIONAL MEDICINE AND DRUG DISCOVERY, supra note 197, at 3, 3. 
 204. Id. at 4–6; see also ERLAND STEVENS, MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY: THE MODERN 
DRUG DISCOVERY PROCESS 15, 95–100 (2014). 
 205. Littman, supra note 203, at 4. 
 206. Id. at 7–13. 
 207. Id. 
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This is “translational” medicine, and it differs fundamentally from the ex-
perimental approach of screening compounds in animals.208  Translational 
medicine is viewed as having an enormous upside.  It will work from biological 
theory rather than trial and error; it is multidisciplinary, leveraging the exper-
tise of statisticians, laboratory medicine, engineers, and programmers; and it 
should push promising compounds into clinical testing earlier.  FDA has em-
braced translational medicine, for example by issuing guidance that accommo-
dates the earlier shift to human testing.209  The agency will accept a smaller and 
simpler submission – an “exploratory IND” – supporting what many call the 
“phase 0” trial.210  This trial typically involves administration of a micro-dose, 
or a dose expected to have pharmacologic but not toxic effects, to a very small 
number of individuals.211  Because the study size is small and the dose low, the 
preclinical safety package to support an exploratory IND can be smaller than 
the preclinical package required to support a conventional IND – perhaps five 
or six studies performed over three to six months, instead of the usual nine to 
twelve studies that take as long as eighteen months.212  Moreover, the clinical 
program should itself be shorter.  If compounds are correctly identified on the 
basis of biological theory, they could have a more significant effect on the dis-
ease in question, which could make it possible to show effectiveness with 
smaller and shorter phase 3 trials.213  Thus, the thinking goes, translational 
medicine will reduce the number of failed drugs and shorten premarket time-
lines. 
This potential has not yet been realized.  The overall attrition rate for new 
drugs remains high – “horrendously high” according to NIH Director Francis 
 
 208. FDA CRITICAL PATH REPORT, supra note 85, at ii; see generally Francis S. 
Collins, Reengineering Translational Science: The Time is Right, 3 SCI. 
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1 (2011) (describing the process of translational medicine). 
 209. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, INVESTIGATORS, AND REVIEWERS: EXPLORATORY IND 
STUDIES (Jan. 2006), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregu-
latoryinformation/guidances/ucm078933.pdf [hereinafter EXPLORATORY IND 
GUIDANCE]; see also OFFICE OF TRANSLATIONAL SCI., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
FDA STAFF MANUAL GUIDES, VOLUME I – ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS 1–2 (Dec. 
10, 2012), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Staff-
ManualGuides/UCM348370.pdf (describing creation of Office of Translational Sci-
ences and explaining its responsibilities); Collins, supra note 208, at 1 (announcing 
establishment of a new National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences, at the 
National Institutes of Health). 
 210. See Collins, supra note 208, at 3. 
 211. Id. at 1; see also DAVID JACOBSON-KRAM, OVERVIEW OF THE EXPLORATORY 
IND: DIFFERENCES FROM THE TRADITIONAL IND 7–8 (Oct. 4, 2007), http://www.na-
tionalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/92B1B2A5B6A14D8496B3FF315DF50763.ashx. 
 212. See EXPLORATORY IND GUIDANCE, supra note 209, at 4; JACOBSON-KRAM, 
supra note 211, at 14. 
 213. Abeloff, supra note 129.  
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Collins – and may be increasing.214  Recent estimates place the phase 2 failure 
rate at sixty-five to seventy percent and even higher for drugs with new mech-
anisms of action.215  Some research suggests the attrition stems mostly from 
lack of effectiveness, which may follow naturally from bringing a larger num-
ber of candidate compounds into human trials in the first instance, with less 
certainty about their ultimate clinical potential.216  In translation medicine, an 
 
 214. Collins, supra note 208, at 1; see also Bruce H. Littman, Preface to 
TRANSLATIONAL MEDICINE AND DRUG DISCOVERY, xix, xix (calling the attrition rate 
“unsustainable”); FDA CRITICAL PATH REPORT, supra note 85, at R-4 (stating that a 
“new compound entering human trials in 2000 was no more likely to reach the market 
than one entering human testing in 1985”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NEW 
DRUG DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 25 (Nov. 2006), 
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0749.pdf (noting that clinical trial failure rates in-
creased from eighty-two percent during the period 1996 through 1999 to ninety-one 
percent during the period 2000 through 2003); Ismail Kola & John Landis, Opinion, 
Can the Pharmaceutical Industry Reduce Attrition Rates?, 3 NATURE REVS. DRUG 
DISCOVERY 711, 712 (2004) (noting the declining success rates of phase 3 trials from 
the 1990s to 2000s); Turner, supra note 197, at 330 (stating that translational medicine 
does not seem to increase success rates in phase 2 or phase 3). 
 215. Littman, supra note 203, at 21; see also David C. Swinney & Jason Anthony, 
How Were New Medicines Discovered?, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 507, 507 
(2011) (examining seventy-five first-in-class drugs with new molecular mechanisms of 
action approved between 1999 and 2008, finding that substantially more resulted from 
phenotypic screening than from target-based approach, and postulating that a target-
centric approach “may contribute to the current high attrition rates and low productiv-
ity” in drug research and development); JACOBSON-KRAM, supra note 211, at 14–15. 
 216. Littman, supra note 203, at 21 (noting two studies that attributed failures to 
lack of effectiveness); Turner, supra note 197, at 330 (less certainty about their “prop-
erties and clinical potential”).  The high failure rate could also stem from (1) the fact 
that the easy solutions to chronic diseases of aging have already been found, leaving 
the more difficult solutions to these diseases for now, and (2) the fact that researchers 
are now focusing on diseases that are simply harder to solve; progressive diseases of 
the central nervous system are one notorious example.  See id. at 329 (arguing that after 
Hatch-Waxman, industry “entered a period of declining productivity, driven in large 
part by its own success in innovating therapies with clear-cut etiologies and treatment 
paradigms that essentially made differentiated new drugs more difficult to discover and 
develop”); see also Joseph Cook et al., The Future Costs, Risks, and Rewards of Drug 
Development: The Economics of Pharmacogenomics, 27 PHARMACOECON. 355, 360 
(2009) (noting possibility that “past research has already addressed those medical needs 
most easily solved, causing the number of compounds that might need to be studied to 
resolve an unmet medical need to increase”).  One recent empirical study, which exam-
ined a large international database containing information on research and development 
of more than 28,000 compounds since 1990, found that companies are increasingly 
focusing on more difficult targets characterized by high failure rates and that this “re-
orienting” of investment accounted for most of the recent decline in productivity in 
research.  Fabio Pammolli et al., The Productivity Crisis in Pharmaceutical R&D, 10 
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 428, 436 (2011). 
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entire drug development program can crumble if the biological target is mis-
understood.  For instance, the biological target might turn out to be merely 
associated with the disease or with disease progression, rather than lying in the 
disease’s causal pathway.217  Or the disease may turn out to have redundant 
pathways; modulating the biological target may simply shut off one pathway, 
causing the body to compensate by enhancing disease progression through an-
other pathway.218  Unexpected safety problems may also account for a substan-
tial amount of attrition.219  In the end, we are still profoundly limited in our 
ability to predict, before phase 2 and 3 trials, whether modulating any particular 
biological target will achieve a desirable clinical outcome and whether it will 
have acceptable side effects.220  The translational approach is limited by our 
lack of scientific capacity to predict the full spectrum of clinical effects that 
will result from modulating a particular biological target. 
Industry has been slow to embrace the exploratory IND.  Although the 
reasons for this are unclear, going into early human testing with less infor-
mation about any ultimate clinical potential has important implications for the 
length of the post-market reward period.  Proof of mechanism testing in hu-
mans – the initial phase 0 trial that screens a large number of compounds at 
micro-doses in very small numbers of human subjects – does not start a devel-
opment project down the traditional runway to regulatory approval the way a 
phase 1 trial did in 1984.  At this stage in translational drug development, re-
searchers may have little idea of the nature of any eventual medicine that might 
be proposed at the end of the process.  There may be a substantial gap before 
phase 2 trials occur and an even more substantial gap before trials to assess a 
clinical endpoint.  Moreover, although the proof of mechanism testing might 
screen a large number of compounds, a company generally selects only one or 
a few for phase 2 and only one for the full clinical program.  If the company 
 
 217. TARGETED DRUG DEVELOPMENT, supra note 178, at 2 (“[B]iochemical targets 
and biomarkers that appear to be linked to the disease progression often fail because, 
while associated with the disease, they are not directly in the causal pathway . . . .”); 
Jack W. Scannell et al., Diagnosing the Decline in Pharmaceutical R&D Efficiency, 11 
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 191, 195 (2012) (noting that “if the causal link be-
tween single targets and disease states is weaker than commonly thought, or if drugs 
rarely act on a single target, one can understand why the molecules that have been de-
livered by this research strategy into clinical development may not necessarily be more 
likely to succeed than those in earlier periods” (footnotes omitted)). 
 218. See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 204, at 20. 
 219. Business decisions may account for the remainder of the attrition.  John Ar-
rowsmith, A Decade of Change, 11 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 17, 17 (2012) 
(“The weakest link in the chain was, and still is, in Phase II, where around 50% of 
failures are typically due to efficacy, 30% are due to strategic reasons and 20% are due 
to safety concerns.” (footnote omitted)). 
 220. PCAST REPORT, supra note 12, at 17–18 (noting that our current success rate 
is “around 9 percent” and that our “greatest need is for improved methods for target 
validation”); FDA CRITICAL PATH REPORT, supra note 85, at R-10 (arguing that aca-
demia, industry, and agency need to develop better predictive tools to screen candidates 
in the first instance). 
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must return to the drawing board because translation fails, it might select a 
runner-up compound, but this could be some time after the exploratory screen-
ing in humans.  And yet, conventional wisdom still generally counsels that a 
patent application should be filed before clinical testing starts.  If the preclinical 
period is shorter, this may mean the patent application is filed earlier in time 
(relative to market launch) and the effective patent life shorter, unless the clin-
ical period (from phase 0 testing to NDA submission) is itself the same or 
shorter. 
The high failure rate is therefore concerning.  When a biological target 
and compound are generally understood but several rounds of clinical trials are 
required to optimize the compound’s therapeutic potential, the clock is ticking 
on the active ingredient patent.  One agency scientist noted in 2007 that the 
perception that exploratory INDs protract the clinical timeline may be one rea-
son industry has not fully embraced them.221  Perhaps not surprisingly there is 
renewed interest in the phenotypic approach to drug development.222 
Continuing evolution in clinical trial and statistical methodologies also 
have the potential to shorten phase 3 trials in the years ahead.223  One possibil-
ity is enrichment strategies, which use patient characteristics to select a study 
 
 221. JACOBSON-KRAM, supra note 211, at 22. 
 222. See generally Wei Zheng et al., Phenotypic Screens as a Renewed Approach 
for Drug Discovery, 18 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 1067 (2013) (arguing that use of cell-
based phenotypic assays to screen compound libraries could lead to a new era of drug 
discovery); Bridget K. Wagner, The Resurgence of Phenotypic Screening in Drug Dis-
covery and Development, 11 EXPERT OPINION DRUG ON DISCOVERY 121, 124 (2016) 
(arguing that “[i]n the interest of saving costs from late-stage clinical failures, it would 
seem attractive for the pharmaceutical industry to take phenotypic approaches more 
frequently during screening campaigns”); see also Michael Leviten, The Phenomics 
Phenomenon: Why Phenotypic Screens are Making a Comeback, BIOCENTURY (Mar. 
23, 2017, 6:51 PM), https://www.biocentury.com/bc-innovations/tools-tech-
niques/2017-03-23/why-phenotypic-screens-are-making-comeback (suggesting re-
newed interest in phenotypic approach “after several analyses published on the origins 
of new medicines surprisingly showed that most came from phenotypic studies rather 
than the target driven approaches dominating the industry”).  Thanks to improved cell-
based models of disease, better imaging techniques, and improved computation capa-
bilities, the new phenotypic approach may be more efficient than the phenotypic 
screens of the 1980s.  Id. 
 223. In addition to the enrichment strategies and adaptive design discussed in text, 
a shift from frequentist to Bayesian statistical methods may permit smaller trials and 
thereby shorten phase 3 timelines.  PCAST REPORT, supra note 12, at 21 (noting that 
Bayesian design may allow smaller trials).  Increased use of Bayesian methods has been 
anticipated for some time.  See generally Edmund A. Gehan, Biostatistics in the New 
Millennium: A Consulting Statistician’s Perspective, 9 STAT. METHODS MED. RES. 3 
(2000) (predicting a shift from frequentist statistical analysis to Bayesian methods, or 
empirical Bayesian methods); Robert Temple, How FDA Currently Makes Decisions 
on Clinical Studies, 2 CLINICAL TRIALS 276, 276, 278–80 (describing several drug ap-
provals where the agency had departed from frequentist analysis and used “some of the 
thinking processes that are involved in Bayesian approaches”); see also FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,  PDUFA REAUTHORIZATION 
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population in which detection of drug effect is more likely (or the effect more 
significant or noticeable).224  As a statistical matter, this allows a smaller and 
shorter trial.225  To give a concrete example: Genentech used genetic infor-
mation to prescreen breast cancer patients for trials of the biological medicine 
Herceptin (trastuzumab), which cut the trial from ten years to 1.6 years.  
Screening permitted enrollment of 470 patients who were expected to have a 
fifty percent response rate.  To get the same number of positive responses with-
out the genetic screen, Genentech would have needed to enroll 2200 patients 
with a ten percent response rate.226  Another possibility is adaptive trial design.  
This innovation responds to the fact that post hoc subgroup analyses of large 
datasets often suggest that a trial limited to that subgroup would have been 
successful.  FDA uniformly rejects post hoc subgroup analyses, however, and 
starting over protracts the timeline.  An adaptive trial design pre-specifies sub-
groups of interest and plans protocol changes on the basis of accumulating 
data.227  Whether the sponsor uses enrichment or adaptive trial design, how-
ever, the resulting approved new drug is labeled narrowly for the particular 
stratified patient subset.  The sponsor, healthcare professionals, insurers, and 
patients thus face the same trade-offs as in the Paraplatin example. 
V.  PREMARKET RESEARCH FROM 1984 TO 2016 
The innovation paradox is that the post-market reward is flat or decreases 
if a company spends more time in premarket research and development.  It is 
true of patents regardless of field of technology, and it should generally skew 
 
PERFORMANCE GOALS AND PROCEDURES FISCAL YEARS 2018 THROUGH 2022, at 31, 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/Prescrip-
tionDrugUserFee/UCM511438.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2018) (committing to facilitat-
ing the use of “complex adaptive, Bayesian, and other novel clinical trial designs”). 
 224. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: ENRICHMENT STRATEGIES FOR CLINICAL TRIALS TO SUPPORT 
APPROVAL OF HUMAN DRUGS AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 2 (Dec. 2012), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinfor-
mation/guidances/ucm332181.pdf [hereinafter ENRICHMENT STRATEGIES]. 
 225. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PAVING THE 
WAY FOR PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 54 (Oct. 2013), https://dx.adva-
med.org/sites/dx.advamed.org/files/resource/fda_report_on_pav-
ing_the_way_for_personalized_medicine.pdf [hereinafter PAVING THE WAY] (stratify-
ing a disease “can dramatically shorten overall drug development and review times”); 
see generally ENRICHMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 224. 
 226. Cook et al., supra note 216, at 357. 
 227. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: ADAPTIVE DESIGN CLINICAL TRIALS FOR DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS 7–14 
(Feb. 2010), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory-
Information/Guidances/UCM201790.pdf; see Anup Malani et al., Accounting for Het-
erogeneous Treatment Effects in the FDA Approval Process, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 23, 
25 (2012); see also Deepak L. Bhatt & Cyrus Mehta, Adaptive Designs for Clinical 
Trials, 375 NEJM 65 (2016) (offering four case studies). 
44
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss1/6
2018] THE DRUG INNOVATION PARADOX 83 
firms to projects with shorter time to market or to decisions within a project 
that shorten the time to market.  The concern is that in the field of medicine the 
impact is different – that due to the theory of our new drug approval system, 
the paradox will skew choices away from particular development programs and 
therefore types of medicine.  The impact of the paradox may, however, be un-
knowable.  FDA approves roughly as many new molecular entities per year as 
it ever did, but we have no way of knowing the drugs that would have been 
developed and approved had the incentive structure been different. 
Parts II and IV of this Article suggest some hypotheses, however, that are 
relevant to understanding the paradox: (1) the preclinical research period has 
been getting shorter; (2) the clinical period has increased in length, at least for 
some types of product; (3) there is variability in the length of the clinical testing 
period by therapeutic category and perhaps also within therapeutic categories; 
(4) surrogate endpoints can shorten the clinical testing period; and (5) certain 
types of product will generally require a longer research and development pe-
riod.  Products that generally require a longer research and development period 
should be those intended for long-term use to prevent, delay, or mitigate a later-
in-life clinical event (except where a validated surrogate endpoint is available) 
and those intended to modify the natural history of a progressive or degenera-
tive disease.  Because FDA publishes information about the length of the clin-
ical testing period in connection with applications for patent term restoration, 
it is possible to describe these points empirically. 
A.  Dataset and Methodology 
The dataset used in this section relates to 570 distinct regulatory review 
periods – clinical testing followed by FDA review of a new drug application – 
each of which resulted in approval of a product with a new active ingredient, 
meaning an active ingredient not previously approved for use in humans.228  
The dataset of 570 regulatory review periods was generated as follows. 
 
 228. Sometimes a single premarket program leads to more than one application. 
The analysis in this subsection focuses on distinct regulatory review periods rather than 
distinct applications.  For instance, Parke-Davis and Warner Lambert collaborated with 
Sankyo in the development of troglitazone for treatment of type II diabetes.  The com-
panies submitted companion NDAs for Rezulin and Prelay, which were approved on 
the same day with identical labeling (apart from the brand name and manufacturer 
name).  There was only one regulatory review period, and PTO restored only one pa-
tent, which protected both products.  See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF PATENT TERM UNDER 35 USC 156 FOR U.S. 
PATENT 4,572,912 (Feb. 27, 1997).  The regulatory review period was counted once in 
the analysis.  In another instance, PTO restored two patents in connection with the same 
regulatory review period.  Application 21,446 for Lyrica (pregabalin) covered treat-
ment of neuropathic pain associated with diabetic neuropathy, and application 21,723 
covered treatment of post-herpetic neuralgia.  According to FDA, the Lyrica applica-
tion was “administratively split” by indication because the review divisions and time-
lines were different.  See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., APPROVAL PACKAGE FOR NDA 21-446, 
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First, PTO provided a spreadsheet of all patent term restoration applica-
tions received between September 28, 1984, and September 30, 2016.  PTO 
also maintains a table of patent term restoration grants on its website.229  Nei-
ther is complete, and the lists were therefore combined and the duplicates de-
leted.230  Second, the approved new drugs were pulled for analysis.  Section 
156 authorizes patent term restoration for other regulated products, such as 
food additives and medical devices.  These were excluded.231  Third, only ap-
proved new drugs for which FDA had published a regulatory review period on 
or before October 1, 2016, comprised the final dataset.  The agency does this 
if it concludes that the NDA in question resulted in the first commercial mar-
keting of the active ingredient, that is, if it concludes that the active ingredient 
was new.232 
At the end of this process, the dataset contained 570 distinct regulatory 
review periods.  This comprises every NDA for a new active ingredient as to 
which FDA had calculated a regulatory review period by October 1, 2016.  This 
Part refers to these as 570 new drugs, NDAs, or products; each corresponds to 
a distinct regulatory review period associated with a distinct and new active 
ingredient and usually only one NDA.233  In five cases, however, the applicant 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE/CORRESPONDENCE REVIEWS (July 28, 2004) (Office Director’s Sign-
Off Memorandum); Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharm. U.S.A., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 643, 656 
(D. Del. 2012) (explaining that because FDA approved two Lyrica applications on the 
same day, PTO agreed that two patents were entitled to restoration).  The regulatory 
review period was counted only once in the analysis. 
 229. Patent Terms Extended Under 35 U.S.C. § 156, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/patent-term-extension/patent-
terms-extended-under-35-usc-156 (last visited Mar. 2, 2018). 
 230. For instance, the spreadsheet omitted – but the table included – Atrovent 
(ipratrop ium).  The table omitted – but the spreadsheet included – more than fifty new 
drugs with restored patents, including Savella (milnacipran hydrochloride), Potiga 
(ezogabine), and Myfortic (mycophenolic acid).  It is impossible to rule out the possi-
bility that some patent term restoration applications were omitted from both documents, 
but no other regulatory review periods were published in the Federal Register. 
 231. This was done by categorizing the products on the basis of regulatory provi-
sions – new drug approval, biological product licensure, medical device approval or 
clearance, new animal drug approval, or food additive petition – applied by FDA. 
 232. FDA calculated one regulatory review period and later concluded that the 
product did not contain a new active ingredient.  The drug is Adsol, used for collection 
and storage of blood and blood components.  It was excluded from the dataset because 
the dataset was defined as all approved new active ingredient drugs for which FDA had 
published a regulatory review period by October 1, 2016, when data collection closed. 
 233. Although FDA has calculated 570 regulatory review periods, these did not all 
result in patent term restoration.  One request – Bextra (valdecoxib) – was ultimately 
denied because the request had not been timely filed, and another – Zemuron (rocu-
ronium bromide) – received no actual restoration because the applicant already had 
fourteen years of effective life on the patent proposed for restoration.  Also, there were 
thirty-four calculated regulatory review periods for which the patent term restoration 
request was still pending on October 1, 2016. 
46
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss1/6
2018] THE DRUG INNOVATION PARADOX 85 
performed its clinical testing in another country.234  These applicants therefore 
never filed INDs; they proceeded straight to NDAs.  The problem is that section 
156 defines the testing period, for purposes of patent term restoration, as be-
ginning on the date the IND took effect.  As a result, for these five NDAs, FDA 
calculated the testing period as zero days.  This does not mean, however, that 
the drugs spent zero days in clinical trials; it simply means the patent term 
restoration notices do not provide data for analysis.  These five drugs are omit-
ted from the analysis that follows. 
B.  Preclinical Testing Period 
The shift to translational medicine should, in theory, put promising com-
pounds into human trials earlier, truncating the preclinical testing period.  The 
dataset does not provide reliable information about the date that the applicant, 
or any other company, started testing the molecule in the laboratory.  For the 
length of the preclinical research period, therefore, the analysis uses an imper-
fect proxy: the time from the earliest filing of a patent application to the time 
that the clinical testing period began.  The patents reviewed in each case were 
the patents listed by the NDA holder in the Orange Book, as well as the restored 
patent, if it was not listed.235  The Orange Book lists any patent claiming the 
drug or an approved method of using the drug and should generally include the 
initial active ingredient patent, if there was one.236  Because the goal was to 
identify the earliest possible point in time when preclinical work might have 
been underway, the earliest available date was used.237  The effective date of 
the IND, published by FDA in the Federal Register, served as the end of the 
preclinical period. 
Fourteen drugs were excluded from the preclinical analysis.  These drugs 
were never associated with any listed patents, even though the drugs were eli-
gible for patent listing.  For these drugs, the only patent in the dataset is the 
patent proposed for restoration.  The statute required these firms to list any 
patent claiming the drug itself,238 so the lack of any listed patents means the 
 
 234. These are Xyzal (levocetirizine dihydrochloride), DaTscan (ioflupane I-123), 
Coartem (artemether; lumefantrine), Promit (dextran 1), and Lac-Hydrin (ammonium 
lactate). 
 235. The Orange Book is in its 37th edition.  See APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS, su-
pra note 90.  The information in the current print edition also appears in an electronic 
database on the FDA website, but neither lists expired patents.  Id.  To determine the 
patents listed for each NDA in the dataset, all prior annual print editions of the Orange 
Book were reviewed. 
 236. See id. (section titled “Patent and Exclusivity Lists”). 
 237. This was the earliest of the actual filing date of the application to hand, the 
filing dates of any related U.S. applications, the priority date of any foreign patent ap-
plication cited by the patentee, and any Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”) filing date.  
The goal was to identify a reasonable proxy for the earliest point in time that the appli-
cant might have been doing preclinical work. 
 238. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b)(1) (West 2018). 
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restored patent was not an active ingredient patent.  These drugs were therefore 
omitted from analysis of the preclinical period. 
After excluding the fourteen drugs without patent listings and the five 
drugs tested overseas, the remaining 551 new active ingredient drugs had an 
average preclinical period of 5.61 years (median 4.8, standard deviation 4.13).  
To examine a possible time trend in the length of the preclinical testing period, 
the 551 drugs were sorted by the patent filing date, which had served as a proxy 
for the start of preclinical research.  The earliest patent filing date was Septem-
ber 5, 1964, and the latest was May 13, 2005.  The patent filing dates were 
arranged in three-year increments. 
 
  
Although Figure 1 shows a downward trend line, caution is warranted.  
There is a potential for selection bias at both ends. 
First, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments did not take effect until Septem-
ber 1984, and the earliest approved drug in the dataset received FDA approval 
in August 1984.  Thus, if a drug that started preclinical testing in the 1960s 
appears in the dataset at all, the overall premarket program (preclinical plus 
clinical testing) took a long time.  Other drugs from those years that completed 
testing more quickly will not appear in the dataset.  The information for these 
years may be skewed to indicate a longer than warranted average preclinical 
period.  Second, the opposite may be true for the final time intervals.  If a drug 
that started preclinical testing in the late 1990s or early 2000s appears in the 
dataset, its overall premarket program may have been unusually short.  Other 
drugs that started preclinical testing at the same time may yet be unapproved.  


























Date of Earliest Patent Filing (n)
Figure 1.  Average Time from Earliest 
Patent Filing to Start of Clinical Trials
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shorter than warranted average preclinical period.  If one excludes the intervals 
before 1973 and after 1993, there is still a downward trend but it is less stark. 
The inclusion of antibiotics could have skewed the trend line, but if any-
thing it should have reduced the downward slope.  Prior to 1997, new antibiotic 
drugs were not subject to the patent listing or exclusivity provisions of the Fed-
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”),239 and the pre-1997 antibiotics 
were not themselves subject to patent listing requirements until 2008.240  The 
dataset includes thirty-two antibiotic drugs that were not subject to patent list-
ing prior to 2008.  For these drugs, the analysis considered the patent proposed 
for restoration and any patents listed after 2008.  In any case where this ap-
proach overlooked an already expired active ingredient patent, the actual start 
of preclinical work could have been much earlier than assumed by using the 
proxy.  In this case, the preclinical period would be longer than reflected in 
Figure 1.  Because the lack of patent listings affects only antibiotics approved 
by FDA before 1997, however, any distortion would raise the averages at the 
beginning of the time sequence and should not change the fact that the preclin-
ical period trends downward over time, although it might change the slope. 
Assuming the downward trend line is correct, there is more than one pos-
sible explanation.  First, it may mean that the preclinical testing period has 
been getting shorter.  This is consistent with the shift to the translational ap-
proach to drug discovery, which puts compounds into patients faster.  Inter-
preting the trend line to mean shorter preclinical testing periods is also con-
sistent with the fact that industry investment in the preclinical phase has been 
declining for several decades.241  Second, it may reflect a change in the timing 
 
 239. Antibiotic drugs reached the market under section 507 of the FDCA rather 
than section 505 of the FDCA prior to November 1, 1997.  21 U.S.C. § 357 (1993) 
(repealed 1997).  The Hatch-Waxman scheme did not apply to them.  In addition to 
twenty-nine antibiotic drugs, FDA approved two cancer treatments under section 507 
and one drug intended for prophylaxis of organ rejection: DaunoXome (daunorubicin 
citrate) approved in 1996 as a first-line cytotoxic therapy for treatment of Kaposi’s 
sarcoma; Idamycin (idarubicin hydrochloride), approved in 1990 for treatment of acute 
myeloid leukemia; and Cellcept (mycophenolate mofetil), approved in 1995 for 
prophylaxis of organ rejection.  See DONALD O. BEERS & KURT R. KARST, GENERIC 
AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS § 4.02(I) (8th 
ed. 2016) (discussing FDA’s use of section 507 for cancer drugs).  Congress repealed 
section 507 in 1997 and enacted a new and unrelated section 507 in 2016.  Food and 
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–115, § 125 (1997) 
(repealing section 507); 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114–255 § 3011, 103 Stat. 
1033, 1086 (2016) (adding a new section 507). 
 240. Q1 Program Supplemental Funding Act of 2008, Pub L. No. 110–379, § 4(b), 
122 Stat. 4075 (2008) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355); Draft Guidance for Industry 
on the Submission of Patent Information for Certain Old Antibiotics, 73 Fed. Reg. 
73,659 (Dec. 3, 2008). 
 241. Fredric J. Cohen, Opinion, Macro Trends in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 4 
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 78, 81 (2005) (noting that since 1976, the industry 
has allocated “relatively more” resources to clinical and regulatory work and relatively 
less to preclinical work). 
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of patent filings.  That is, sponsors may be applying for their initial patents later 
in the preclinical research process, for instance due to changes in patent law.242  
This dataset does not provide a basis for determining whether shorter preclini-
cal periods, later patent filings, or both are responsible. 
There is also a lag inherent in the dataset.  Any trend in the length of 
preclinical testing periods or in the timing of patent filings since the early to 
middle 2000s is not reflected here. 
C.  Clinical Testing Period 
1.  Average Clinical Testing Period 
The 570 products in this database – minus the five studied overseas – have 
an average clinical testing period of 2177 days, or 5.96 years (median 1910 
days, standard deviation 1200 days).  The shortest testing period in the dataset, 
198 days, belongs to Geref (sermorelin acetate), an endocrine/metabolic agent 
approved in 1990 for the treatment of idiopathic growth hormone deficiency in 
children with growth failure.  The longest testing period – 9569 days, or 26.22 
years – belongs to Ampyra (dalfampridine), a potassium channel blocker ap-
proved in 2010 to improve walking in patients with multiple sclerosis. 
The story of Ampyra’s discovery and development illustrates some of the 
challenges of modern drug development.243  Although multiple sclerosis is still 
not fully understood, it involves the immune system attacking myelin, which 
surrounds and insulates the nerve fibers, as well as the fibers themselves.  The 
story begins with 4-aminopyridine (or 4-AP), a potassium channel blocker and 
potent nervous system toxicant used as a bird poison in the United States in the 
early 1970s.244  Studies in insects, mollusks, and other animals in the 1970s 
and 1980s explored the impact of 4-aminopyridine on nerve fibers and sug-
gested it could help electrical impulses travel across demyelinated nerves.245  
Establishing in animal studies that a chemical can help electrical impulses 
 
 242. For instance, beginning in 1995 patent terms were calculated from the date of 
patent application rather than from the data of patent issuance.  See supra note 93.  This 
might have prompted later patent filings in industries subject to premarket regulatory 
review.  Changes in patent doctrine due to significant judicial decisions could also af-
fect patenting practices. 
 243. See generally Lisa Emrich, FDA Approves Ampyra (Dalfampridine), Previ-
ously Known as Ampriva (Fampridine-SR), Amaya (Fampridine-SR), and 4-Amino-
pyridine or 4-AP, BRASS & IVORY (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.brassandi-
vory.org/2010/01/fda-approves-ampyra-dalfampridine.html. 
 244. U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, Reregistration Eligibility Decision for 4-Amino-
pyridine 7 (Sept. 27, 2007), https://archive.epa.gov/pesticides/reregistra-
tion/web/pdf/aminopyridine_red.pdf (noting initial pesticide registration in 1972). 
 245. See generally, e.g., R. M. Sherratt et al., Effects of 4-Aminopyridine on Normal 
and Demyelinated Mammalian Nerve Fibres, 283 NATURE 570 (1980); J. I. Gillespie 
& O. F. Hutter, The Actions of 4-Aminopyridine on the Delayed Potassium Current in 
Skeletal Muscle Fibres, 252 J. PHYSIOLOGY 70P (1975). 
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travel through nerves is, however, a far cry from knowing the best way that 
chemical can be deployed to benefit human patients.  The proof of a useful 
biological activity in animals is just the beginning. 
Academic and commercial researchers explored possible ways this com-
pound could be best developed for patients, considering not only multiple scle-
rosis but spinal cord injuries and Guillain-Barre syndrome.246  Early clinical 
trials involved only a few patients and were essentially phase 0 studies de-
signed for proof of principle.  A trial in 1983 examined the effect of 4-amino-
pyridine on visual function in ten patients with multiple sclerosis.247  Another 
trial in 1986 examined vision, oculomotor function, and motor function in 
twelve patients.248  The first U.S. trial in humans was on February 10, 1983, 
and is the reason FDA calculated 9569 days for the testing period; because it 
occurred in the United States, this trial required an effective IND.249  When the 
IND took effect, the pharmaceutical company that would eventually develop a 
sustained release formulation that delivered stable blood levels of the drug and 
that would establish this product’s safety and effectiveness for the improve-
ment of walking ability in patients with multiple sclerosis did not even exist. 
In 1990, Elan Corporation acquired the rights to 4-aminopyridine from 
the Rush Multiple Sclerosis Center in Chicago and began developing a product, 
which it intended to call Neurelan.250  Elan conducted larger trials examining 
the effect of the drug – then assigned the generic name “fampridine” and later 
changed to “dalfampridine” – on a wide variety of neurophysiological meas-
urements.251  Clinical testing indicated that fampridine has a narrow therapeutic 
index, specifically a risk of seizure when at peak concentration in the blood.  
 
 246. See Sherratt et al., supra note 245. 
 247. Richard E. Jones et al., Effects of 4-Aminopyridine in Patients with Multiple 
Sclerosis, 60 J. NEUROLOGY SCI. 353 (1983). 
 248. Dusan Stefoski et al., 4-Aminopyridine Improves Clinical Signs in Multiple 
Sclerosis, 21 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 71 (1987). 
 249. Determination of Regulatory Review Period for Purposes of Patent Extension; 
AMPYRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 12,974, 12,974 (Mar. 9, 2011).  The substance had been ad-
ministered intravenously to a few people outside the United States in the 1970s.  E.g., 
H. Lundh et al., Effects of 4-Aminopyridine in Myasthenia Gravis, 42 J. NEUROLOGY, 
NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 171, 171 (1979) (assessing effect in six patients). 
 250. See Elan Adds U.S. Marketing Presence Through Athena Neurosciences Mer-
ger; Athena Alzheimer’s Research Will Be More Independent, Biotech Firm Says, PINK 
SHEET (Mar. 25, 1996). 
 251. E.g., Christopher T. Bever, Jr., et al., Preliminary Trial of 3,4-Diamino-
pyridine in Patients with Multiple Sclerosis, 27 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 421 (1990); see 
also Christopher T. Bever, Jr., et al., The Effects of 4-Aminopyridine in Multiple Scle-
rosis Patients: Results of a Randomized Placebo-Controlled, Double-Blind, Concen-
tration-Controlled, Crossover Trial, 44 J. NEUROLOGY 1054 (1994); Christopher T. 
Bever, Jr., The Current Status of Studies of Aminopyridines in Patients with Multiple 
Sclerosis, 36 ANNALS NEUROLOGY S118 (1994). 
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This led Elan to develop a safer sustained-release formulation, known as fam-
pridine-SR.252  In 1994 and 1996, Elan obtained patents for the sustained re-
lease technology associated with fampridine-SR, including U.S. Patent No. 
5,540,938, which Acorda would license from Elan and for which the company 
would eventually seek restoration. 
Acorda was founded in 1995 to develop treatments for spinal injuries and 
other central nervous system disorders.  The two companies formed a joint 
venture in 1997, with Elan contributing rights to the sustained release formu-
lation and Acorda conducting clinical trials.253  The run-up to FDA approval of 
Ampyra began in earnest in November 2000, with a double-blind, placebo-
controlled, dose-ranging study of fampridine-SR intended to settle on tolerable 
doses for a sustained release product.254  This was seventeen years after the 
earliest administration of fampridine to humans in the United States.  The com-
pany suffered a setback when the phase 3 program for treatment of spinal cord 
injury failed; both studies missed their primary endpoints, one in late 2003 and 
the other in early 2004.255 
The multiple sclerosis development program had been proceeding in par-
allel but was slightly behind; Acorda met with the agency to discuss the results 
of the phase 2 testing in the summer of 2004.256  Clinical trial design for the 
phase 3 multiple sclerosis trials was a significant hurdle, in part because the 
endpoint was unprecedented.257  Those trials began in December 2005 and Au-
gust 2007, and during phase 3 the company and agency met more than once to 
discuss study results and trial design.258  FDA and Acorda met again in October 
2008 to discuss the NDA and Acorda submitted the application the following 
April – twelve years after acquiring the rights to fampridine-SR. 
The Ampyra story illustrates several points about new drug research and 
development.  First, early research may occur with very little vision of a fin-
ished product.  The initial work occurred after the basic mechanism of multiple 
sclerosis (demyelination) was understood.  Researchers then considered the 
 
 252. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
NDA 22250, CROSS DISCIPLINE TEAM LEADER REVIEW 2 (Jan. 20, 2010), 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2010/022250s000_CrossR.pdf 
[hereinafter FDA MEMO]. 
 253. Elan Meltdown May End R&D Joint Ventures as Funding Vehicle for Biotech, 
PINK SHEET (Feb. 11, 2002).  The companies later entered a licensing agreement.  Id. 
 254. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., NDA 
22250, MEDICAL REVIEW(S) 18 (Dec. 10, 2009), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drug-
satfda_docs/nda/2010/022250s000_MedR.pdf [hereinafter AMPYRA CLINICAL 
REVIEW]. 
 255. FDA MEMO, supra note 252, at 3. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See id. at 10; see also Mary Jo Laffler, The Long Road to Approval: Acorda 
Experience with Ampyra Shows Success of Novel Analysis Plan, PINK SHEET (Dec. 1, 
2010). 
 258. See AMPYRA CLINICAL REVIEW, supra note 254, at 20; FDA MEMO, supra note 
252, at 4. 
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possibility that a compound with neurotoxic effects in animals would disrupt 
the effect of demyelination on nerve conductivity.  This required very early 
testing in humans, long before any thought could be given to a potential product 
and before any thought could be given to an eventual clinical indication (i.e., 
visual acuity versus gait versus coordination, or – as it turned out – walking 
speed).  Indeed the disease in which this promising compound could be most 
effectively deployed had not been determined. 
Second, a product that fails to meet a particular endpoint in one disease 
or condition could succeed with a different endpoint in that disease or condition 
or, as in this case, a different disease or condition.  Failure in a particular phase 
3 program may have very little to do with the therapeutic potential of the in-
vention or its value to society.  Yet resource constraints may mean that a firm 
will not start the second phase 3 program until the first phase 3 program fails, 
which in turn has clear negative consequences for effective patent life. 
Third, a commercial firm that acquires the rights to a molecule after basic 
research has been done may not gain a meaningful head start on account of the 
research.  Phase 1 involved brief clinical pharmacology trials.  The bulk of the 
work remained: phase 2, with its high attrition rates, and phase 3 (in this case, 
two rounds of phase 3), with its full-blown efficacy endpoints.  In situations 
where the active ingredient patent application is filed before clinical testing, 
this company stands very little chance of having meaningful patent protection 
for the new product that it brings to market.  The patent claiming the sustained 
release formulation and its use had only three and a half years of patent life left 
by the time Ampyra was approved.  With restoration, it had eight and a half 
years of effective life. 
Although the length of the clinical testing period of Ampyra seems strik-
ing, Fulyzaq (crofelemer), intended for treatment of diarrhea in patients with 
HIV taking anti-retroviral therapy, had a 20.2-year testing period.  Strattera 
(atomoxetine hydrochloride), intended for treatment of attention-deficit hyper-
activity disorder (“ADHD”), spent twenty years in trials.  Two antibiotic drugs 
– Orbactiv (oritavancin) and Cubicin (daptomycin) – spent 17.2 years and 16.9 
years, respectively, in clinical testing.  It is tempting to suggest that these ex-
periences were not classic or conventional new drug research and development 
programs – that some were programs abandoned and restarted, and others char-
acterized by serendipity and accident.  But the point is that this seems to happen 
with some frequency.  Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of clinical testing 
period lengths; fifty-nine drugs in the dataset had clinical testing periods ex-
ceeding ten years, and 161 drugs (more than one in four) had clinical programs 
exceeding seven years.  Thirteen of the 161 have patent term restoration re-
quests still pending at the USPTO, but the remaining 148 had an average ef-
fective patent life after patent term restoration of 10.4 years. 
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To be sure, these findings suggest that companies continue to develop 
products that will have spent a very long time in development by the time they 
are approved.  This invites the question whether the structural problem really 
harms innovation.  But even if some companies continue to invest in drugs with 
longer premarket programs, we do not know how many others choose not to, 
or how many new drugs that require long-term research we would have if the 
incentive structure were different.  We do know that several large companies 
have withdrawn from the neuroscience field citing the longer development 
time.259  We also know that firms underinvest in the development of cancer 
drugs that require long-term trials.260  Further, we do not know why companies 
pursue long-term premarket programs.  It is possible that in some cases the 
length of the clinical program was not apparent at the outset, leading to a sunk 
cost effect.261  It is possible that in some cases firms have reasons other than 
 
 259. See Abbott, supra note 11 at 161–62. 
 260. See Budish et al., supra note 10, at 2047. 
 261. The sunk cost effect – also known as “escalation of commitment” or, more 
colloquially, “throwing good money after bad” – characterizes behavior in which a firm 
continues to invest in a decision or process despite increasingly negative outcomes, 
rather than changing its course.  E.g., Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A 
Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action, 16 ORG. BEHAVIOR & 
HUMAN PERFORMANCE 27 (1976); see also Sunk Cost Fallacy: Throwing Good Money 
After Bad, STRATEGIC THINKING & STRATEGIC ACTION (Mar. 21, 2015), http://leepub-
lish.typepad.com/strategicthinking/2015/03/sunk-cost-fallacy.html.  Lilly’s continued 
investment in solenezumab might be an example of this.  After the drug – which had 
been in clinical testing since 2004 – failed in two phase 3 trials that examined its impact 
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patent or data exclusivity to expect a long period of marketing exclusivity (or 
near-exclusivity) or (even in situations where the marketing exclusivity period 
is short) adequate post-approval reward.  For example, a drug might be unusu-
ally difficult to manufacture, which could provide some assurance of near-ex-
clusivity in itself.  A drug to be taken daily for a chronic condition might gen-
erate more revenue during its marketing exclusivity period than a drug that will 
be administered as a single course of treatment lasting ten days. 
2.  Average Clinical Testing Period over Time 
a.  By First-in-Human Date 
The drugs in the dataset were sorted by the year their INDs went into 
effect, permitting testing in humans, to examine a trend in the clinical period 
over time.  Data for the first five years and the last five years were dropped 
because of their potential for selection bias, as follows.  First, the earliest IND 
in the dataset took effect in 1970.  The Hatch-Waxman Amendments did not 
take effect until September 1984, which means the earliest approved drug in 
the dataset received FDA approval in August 1984.  Thus every drug in the 
dataset with a clinical trial start in the early 1970s necessarily took a long time 
in trials.  Put another way, any drugs that started trials in those years and took 
less time would have been approved before 1984 and would not appear in the 
dataset.  Because the dataset inherently omits some drugs that started trials in 
the early 1970s, the information for those years is incomplete and systemati-
cally skewed to suggest a higher average testing period.  Second, precisely the 
opposite is true for the clinical trials starting in the late 2000s.  The latest IND 
in the dataset took effect in 2009.  The latest approved drugs in the dataset 
received approval in early 2014.  Thus every drug in the dataset that started 
trials in the late 2000s necessarily had a short clinical testing period – or it 
would not be in the dataset.  Put another way, the drugs that started trials in 
those years and took more time, or are still taking more time, would not appear 
in the dataset yet.  Because the dataset inherently omits some drugs that started 
testing in the late 2000s, the information for those years is incomplete and sys-
tematically skewed to suggest a shorter average testing period. 
 
on cognitive and functional impairment in mild and moderate Alzheimer’s, the com-
pany realized that participants with mild Alzheimer’s fared better than controls in the 
cognitive portion of the testing.  Still blind to the data from its ongoing third trial, it 
shifted the data analysis plan to improvement of cognitive functioning in mild Alz-
heimer’s.  See Emily Underwood, Why the Big Change to Lilly’s Alzheimer’s Trial Is 
Not Evidence Its Drug Has Failed Again, SCIENCE (Mar. 21, 2016, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/why-big-change-lilly-s-alzheimer-s-trial-
not-evidence-its-drug-has-failed-again; Damian Garde, A Big Alzheimer’s Drug Trial 
Now Wrapping Up Could Offer Real Hope – or Crush It, STAT (Oct. 13, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/10/13/alzheimers-drug-eli-lilly/.  This third phase 3 
trial was also a failure.  Jessica Merrill, Lilly’s Solanezumab Fails, but the Surprise 
Would Have Been Success, PINK SHEET (Nov. 23, 2016). 
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Continuing selection bias could explain the high averages at the begin-
ning of the period in Figure 3 and the apparent downward trend line at the end 
of the period.262  Excluding five years at either end, rather than some other 
number of years, was arbitrary.  If continuing selection bias is treated as likely, 
Figure 3 generally suggests that a company starting clinical trials in 2004 was 
not, on average, facing a meaningfully longer clinical program than a company 
starting clinical trials in 1984.  Whether this remains true today is not known; 
the inherent lag in any dataset based on approved drugs with published Federal 
Register notices relating to patent term restoration requests means that the data 
do not reflect any changes that might be expected by a sponsor starting phase 
1 work in 2010 or later. 
b.  By End-of-Phase 3 Date 
Part IV explained that the design of a phase 3 trial to establish a drug’s 
effectiveness for its proposed use – including the trial’s endpoints, size, and 
duration – reflects many factors, including the drug’s mechanism of action, its 
 
 262. The data from 1975 (average clinical period of 9.03 years) and 1976 (average 
clinical period of 8.0 years) may be biased because any drug that started trials in those 
years and had a moderately short clinical trial experience would have been approved 
before 1984 and would be missing from the dataset.  The data from 2003 (average of 
5.66 years) and 2004 (average of 5.43 years) could be biased for precisely the opposite 
reason; given the range of clinical program lengths in the broader dataset, some drugs 
that started trials in those years might not have reached FDA approval and patent term 




























Year IND Took Effect (n)
Figure 3. Average Length of Clinical 
Program 
by Year Clinical Testing Started
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physiological effect in the body, the disease under investigation, the hypothe-
sized outcome, and possibly other products on the market.  Because several 
phases of clinical testing precede phase 3, sorting the drugs by the start of test-
ing in humans (commencement of phase 1 testing) risks obscuring trends in the 
length of the clinical program caused primarily by evolution in phase 3 design 
over time. 
Trends in the length of the clinical program caused primarily by evolution 
in phase 3 design could be captured better by sorting the drugs by the year that 
phase 3 trials began.  The dataset does not provide a basis for doing so, how-
ever, and the date that phase 3 trials started is not publicly available for every 
drug in the database.  The drugs in the dataset were sorted instead by the year 
that the sponsor submitted its NDA.  This provides a rough proxy for the timing 
of the phase 3 program because NDA submission generally occurs within a 
year of the completion of the final phase 3 trial.263   
 
 
Figure 4 illustrates an upward trend in the length of clinical testing peri-
ods based on a proxy for the date when phase 3 trials ended.  The length of 
clinical programs increases over time when drugs are sorted by NDA submis-
sion date even though it does not increase over time when the drugs are sorted 
by IND effective date.  Considering Figure 3 and Figure 4 together, therefore, 
suggests that the length of the clinical program correlates at least in part with 
 
 263. E.g., Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection; Com-
ment Request; Application for Food and Drug Administration Approval to Market a 
New Drug, 79 Fed. Reg. 16,003, 16,006 (Mar. 24, 2014) (estimating that it takes a new 




























Year NDA Submitted (n)
Figure 4.  Average Length of Clinical 
Program
by Year NDA Submitted
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the date of NDA submission.  Because NDA submission generally follows 
within a year of phase 3 completion, this further suggests that the length of the 
clinical program correlates at least in part with the date that phase 3 trials 
ended.  Without information on the phase 3 start date, it is impossible to deter-
mine whether the trend line reflects an increase in the length of phase 3 trials 
alone.  But some studies have found that phase 3 trials are increasing in 
length.264 
D.  Surrogate Endpoints 
Analysis of the impact of surrogate endpoints on the length of clinical 
programs is challenging because FDA has approved drugs on the basis of sur-
rogate endpoints for nearly all of its history, and there is no reliable compre-
hensive list of these approvals.  Well before the subpart H regulations took 
effect in 1993, for example, FDA approved osteoporosis drugs on the basis of 
total body calcium and bone mineral content, when the clinical outcome of 
interest was reduction in bone fractures.265  Antihypertensives have always 
been approved on the basis of a surrogate endpoint.  The clinical outcome of 
interest is reduction in cardiovascular events including cardiovascular mortal-
ity, but these drugs have always been tested for reduction of blood pressure and 
 
 264. The consulting firm KMR Group examined 4100 oncology trials conducted 
over a ten-year span by thirty-two companies and, relying on proprietary data from 
those companies, found that phase 3 trials increased from an average of 3.5 years (for 
trials started between 2003 and 2005) to an average of five years (for trials started be-
tween 2013 and 2015).  KMR GROUP, 2015 CLINICAL CYCLE TIME TRENDS: SELECT 
FINDINGS FROM KMR GROUP’S ANNUAL CLINICAL DATA PROGRAM (2015) (on file with 
author); Why Are Oncology Clinical Trials Taking Longer?, CLINICAL TRIALS ARENA 
(Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.clinicaltrialsarena.com/news/operations/why-are-oncol-
ogy-clinical-trials-taking-longer-4698649.  On the basis of entries in the NIH clinical 
trials databank, Glass found a thirty percent increase in the per-patient duration of phase 
3 trials from 2008 to 2013 and a forty-one percent increase in per-patient duration of 
oncology trials over the same time period.  Glass et al., supra note 168, at 856.  Using 
a proprietary database, Getz analyzed 10,038 protocols for phase 2 and 3 trials of drugs 
to treat chronic illness and found that between 1999 and 2005 the period from first 
patient first visit to last patient last visit increased by fifty-three percent.  KENNETH 
GETZ, PROTOCOL DESIGN TRENDS AND THEIR EFFECT ON CLINICAL TRIAL 
PERFORMANCE 315–16 (May 2008), http://csdd.tufts.edu/_docu-
ments/www/2816Getz.pdf. 
 265. E.g., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH DRUGS AND THE DRUG SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 42–44, 141 (Mar. 5, 2013), https://wayback.archive-
it.org/7993/20170404145949/https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommit-
tees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Drugs/ReproductiveHealthDrugsAdviso-
ryCommittee/UCM351018.pdf (discussing approval of postmenopausal osteoporosis 
indication for Calcimar (synthetic calcitonin salmon) in 1984, on the basis of total body 
calcium assessed by neutron activation analysis and bone mineral content measured by 
single photon absorptiometry of the forearm). 
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were originally labeled only for reduction of blood pressure.266  The only way 
to definitively categorize the basis of approval of the 570 drugs in the dataset 
would be to examine FDA’s review documents.267  There are, however, pub-
licly available lists of the accelerated approvals under subpart H on the basis 
of novel (not validated) surrogate endpoints.268  Certain comparisons of interest 
can therefore be made. 
First, drugs approved on the basis of novel surrogate endpoints under sub-
part H can be compared with drugs approved under the conventional approval 
regulations after subpart H took effect.  The latter include drugs approved on 
the basis of clinical endpoints and drugs approved on the basis of validated 
surrogate endpoints.  Table 1 reports the results.  There were 413 drugs in the 
dataset approved after January 11, 1993, the effective date of the subpart H 
regulations.  Of these, three were tested overseas, leaving 410 with clinical 
testing information in the dataset.  Of these, thirty-four received accelerated 
approval under subpart H, and 376 had traditional approval.  Table 1 indicates 
that the thirty-four drugs approved on the basis of novel surrogate endpoints 
had an average clinical program of 5.61 years (median 5.08, standard deviation 
2.41), while the traditionally based approvals had an average clinical program 
of 6.28 years (median 5.42, standard deviation 3.43).  Drugs in the dataset ap-
proved on the basis of novel surrogate endpoints after January 11, 1993, spent 
an average of 247 fewer days, around eight fewer months, in clinical testing 
than drugs approved on the basis of traditional clinical endpoints or validated 
surrogate endpoints. 
 
 266. Mehul Desai et al., Antihypertensive Drug Development: A Regulatory Per-
spective, in HYPERTENSION: A COMPANION TO BRAUNWALD’S HEART DISEASE 416, 422 
(Henry R. Black & William Elliott eds., 2013).  Today, many have clinical outcome 
claims in their labeling. 
 267. The review documents for older drugs in the dataset are not posted on 
Drugs@FDA and would need to be obtained through the Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”). 
 268. E.g., Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,  Acceler-
ated & Restricted Approvals Under Subpart H (Drugs) and Subpart E (Biologics), 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevel-
opedandApproved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/ucm121597.htm (last updated 
June 30, 2017). 
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Second, drugs in the dataset approved from 2010 through 2014 on the 
basis of either type of surrogate endpoint can be compared with drugs approved 
during the same window on the basis of clinical endpoints.269  Table 2 reports 
the results.  Of the eighty drugs in the dataset approved in this time period, one 
was tested overseas, leaving seventy-nine for analysis.  The fifty-three drugs 
approved on the basis of clinical endpoints averaged 7.79 years in clinical trials 
(median 6.66, standard deviation 4.51).  The twenty-six drugs approved on the 
basis of surrogate endpoints averaged 6.82 years in clinical trials (median 5.84, 
standard deviation 2.59).  The twenty-one approved on the basis of validated 
surrogate endpoints averaged 6.79 years (median 5.74, standard deviation 
2.77), while the five approved on the basis of novel surrogate endpoints aver-
aged 6.93 years (median 6.21, standard deviation 1.62).  Drugs in the dataset 
approved between 2010 and 2014 on the basis of validated surrogate endpoints 
spent an average of one full year less in clinical trials than drugs approved on 
the basis of clinical endpoints in the same time period. 
 
Table 2. Average Clinical Program Length in Years: 












Mean 7.79 6.82 6.79 6.93 
Median 6.66 5.84 5.74 6.21 
St. Dev. 4.51 2.59 2.77 1.62 
Range 2.39 to 26.22 3.35 to 15.63 3.35 to 15.63 5.22 to 9.35 
 
Together these tables indicate that programs using surrogate endpoints 
are generally shorter than programs using clinical endpoints and that the dif-
ference is most pronounced for validated surrogate endpoints.  The fact that 
 
 269. FDA has published a list of surrogate endpoint approvals during this time pe-
riod.  NOVEL DRUGS, supra note 163, at 2–7. 
Table 1.  Average Clinical Program Length in Years: 










points and clinical end-
points 
Mean 5.61 6.28 
Median 5.08 5.42 
St. Dev. 2.41 3.43 
Range 2.74 to 12.07 1.04 to 26.22 
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surrogate endpoints – validated or novel – are associated with shorter programs 
and less variability is generally consistent with the notion that surrogate end-
points can make an ordinary premarket paradigm possible for drugs that would 
otherwise require an unusually long clinical testing period or an unusually large 
sample size.270  (It is not clear, however, why clinical programs using novel 
surrogate endpoints would take longer on average than clinical programs using 
validated surrogate endpoints.)  It is, of course, impossible to know what sort 
of premarket program these particular drugs would have faced, had the surro-
gate markers not been available.  But these tables suggest that when available, 
surrogate endpoints may be able to mitigate the innovation paradox, ensuring 
that companies will not be deterred by a long premarket program and corre-
spondingly shortened period for post-approval exclusive marketing.  As Part 
IV.A. explained, however, surrogate endpoints are not a panacea for the para-
dox.  First, whether they are available depends on factors beyond a firm’s con-
trol, including the drug’s class and mechanism of action, the disease type and 
stage, the nature of the disease process itself, and any drug off-target effect.271  
Second, FDA has been very cautious about permitting novel surrogate end-
points.  And third, novel surrogate endpoints result in a narrow scope of ap-
proval and labeling; the product is different. 
E.  Other Factors Influencing Length 
The dataset was also explored for possible trends with respect to thera-
peutic category, anticipated length of treatment, and pharmacologic class of the 
active ingredient. 
1.  Therapeutic Category 
The 570 drugs in the dataset (minus the five tested overseas) were sorted 
by therapeutic category.272  Therapeutic categorization of drugs focuses on the 
disease or condition that the drug treats and tends to focus on its primary organ 
or outward signs and symptoms (“cardiovascular” versus “dermatological”).  
 
 270. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 271. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 272. The methodology was crude.  Some drugs in the dataset were withdrawn from 
the market years ago, and several were never launched in the United States.  As a result, 
no commonly used database provides a therapeutic category for every drug in the da-
taset.  An orthogonal approach was adopted.  For each drug, four sources were con-
sulted: the U.S. Pharmacopoeia (“USP”) Medicare Model Guidelines for CMS Version 
6.0, the recently released draft of version 7.0 of the same guidelines, the CDC Long-
Term Care Drug Database System, and the NIH National Library of Medicine Drug 
Portal.  (Another possibility would have been the VA National Formulary, but it too 
lacks information for some of the drugs.)  Based on the information from these four 
sources, each drug was placed into categories corresponding roughly to the USP cate-
gories.  Twelve drugs were not categorized by any of the four sources and were left 
uncategorized. 
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Categories with fewer than five entries were dropped, which left 532 drugs in 
the database. 
Figure 5 illustrates the length of clinical testing periods sorted by thera-
peutic category.  At the high end, as the analysis in Part IV suggested might be 
the case, are the thirteen central nervous system agents, with an average clinical 
testing period of 9.30 years, followed by two categories of psychiatric drugs – 
antipsychotics (averaging 8.63 years) and antidepressants (8.49 years) – and 
two categories that arguably should be part of the central nervous system cate-
gory – anticonvulsants (8.13 years) and anti-Parkinson’s agents (7.48 years).  
At the low end are six antimigraine agents, all serotonin receptor agonists, with 
an average clinical testing period of 2.99 years and a maximum clinical testing 
period of 4.75 years.  Also at the low end are ophthalmic agents (averaging 
4.38 years), sleep disorder drugs (4.47 years), antibacterials (4.59 years), anti-




























0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00














blood glucose regulators (20)
respiratory/pulmonary (32)




























Average Clinical Testing Period by 
Therapeutic Category
62
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss1/6
2018] THE DRUG INNOVATION PARADOX 101 
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for average clinical testing period by 
therapeutic category.  Whether one sorts by average or median, the ten catego-
ries with the longest clinical programs include the following nine: antipsychot-
ics, central nervous system agents, antidepressants, anticonvulsants, anti-Par-
kinson’s agents, immunological agents, blood products, antiemetics, and 
antineoplastic agents. 
 
Table 3.  Average Clinical Testing Period in Years 
by Therapeutic Category 
Category (n) Average Median Min. Max. 
St. 
Dev. 
antimigraine agents (6) 2.99 2.94 1.42 4.75 1.05 
ophthalmic (26) 4.38 4.20 1.04 9.54 1.99 
sleep disorder (5) 4.47 3.55 3.42 6.67 1.30 
antibacterials (51) 4.59 4.39 1.35 17.25 2.89 
antivirals (27) 4.68 4.84 1.84 8.03 1.47 
imaging agents (28) 5.05 3.42 0.54 17.72 4.18 
antifungals (14) 5.13 5.17 1.75 9.27 1.82 
genitourinary (12) 5.29 4.55 2.47 9.26 2.19 
dermatological (13) 5.38 5.42 1.18 8.92 2.20 
anesthetics (8) 5.57 5.30 2.11 9.67 2.55 
metabolic bone disease (7) 5.58 6.28 1.71 9.90 2.68 
respiratory/pulmonary 
(32) 5.73 4.84 1.54 11.61 2.63 
blood glucose regulators 
(20) 6.06 5.40 2.45 12.45 2.64 
antidementia agents (5) 6.08 5.21 2.98 12.87 3.63 
cardiovascular drugs (65) 6.12 5.11 1.88 15.63 3.33 
hormonal (31) 6.33 5.29 1.34 14.32 3.44 
analgesics & anti-inflam-
matories (13) 6.38 5.69 2.95 11.06 2.42 
antineoplastics (58) 6.39 5.95 1.93 13.31 2.69 
antiemetics (7) 6.58 6.39 3.07 10.44 2.69 
blood products (17) 6.70 6.71 1.97 13.07 2.53 
gastrointestinal (19) 6.72 5.52 1.33 20.25 4.28 
immunological (10) 6.77 6.49 2.83 12.61 2.92 
anti-Parkinson’s agents (7) 7.48 7.27 5.52 9.68 1.58 
anticonvulsants (13) 8.13 8.13 4.52 15.07 3.23 
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Table 3.  Average Clinical Testing Period in Years 
by Therapeutic Category 
Category (n) Average Median Min. Max. 
St. 
Dev. 
antidepressants (16) 8.49 7.61 1.74 16.13 3.81 
antipsychotics (9) 8.63 8.32 2.80 16.34 4.65 
central nervous system 
(13) 9.30 7.13 1.48 26.22 6.44 
 
Table 3 suggests there is considerable variability within many of the ther-
apeutic categories.  To begin with, in all but five categories (antivirals, antifun-
gals, dermatological, metabolic bone disease, and blood products) the median 
clinical testing period is below the mean, indicating that in almost every cate-
gory a few drugs with longer clinical testing periods skew the average.  More-
over, drugs in nine categories have standard deviations exceeding three years: 
central nervous system drugs (6.44 years), antipsychotics (4.65), gastrointesti-
nal drugs (4.28), imaging agents (4.18), antidepressants (3.81), antidementia 
drugs (3.63), hormonal drugs (3.44), cardiovascular drugs (3.33), and anticon-
vulsants (3.23).  The least variable categories are the antimigraine drugs (1.05 
years), sleep disorder drugs (1.30), antivirals (1.47), and anti-Parkinson’s 
agents (1.58). 
The apparent variability may be because therapeutic category is a poor 
proxy for the factors that actually determine the length of phase 3 trials.  Cate-
gorizing research and development experiences based on the organ system, 
signs, and symptoms risks missing the scientific and regulatory considerations 
that have the most influence on the length of the premarket period.  Part IV of 
this Article suggests these include the molecule itself and perhaps its mecha-
nism of action and not only the disease but the disease stage and, most im-
portantly, the outcome and use that the firm proposes to test and place in label-
ing. 
2.  Other Factors Relevant to Length of Premarket Period 
a.  Expected Length of Treatment 
Many therapeutic categories combine drugs that are intended for imme-
diate use with drugs that are intended for intermediate or even long-term use.  
For instance, the category of immunological agents includes Firazyr (icatibant 
acetate), approved for treatment of acute attacks of hereditary angioedema, as 
well as Torisel (temsirolimus), approved for treatment of advanced renal cell 
carcinoma, and Xeljanz (tofacitinib citrate), approved for treatment of rheuma-
toid arthritis.  The 570 drugs in this dataset (minus the five tested overseas) 
were therefore categorized by the expected length of treatment for the use ap-
proved by FDA at the end of the regulatory review period.  The categories were 
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acute use (less than one month), intermediate use (between one month and two 
years), and chronic use (greater than two years).273 
Figure 6 shows that drugs intended for chronic use take an average of 6.54 
years in clinical trials (twenty-six percent more time than drugs for acute use), 
while drugs intended for intermediate use take an average of 5.82 years, and 
drugs intended for acute use take an average of 5.20 years.  The median clinical 
testing period follows the same pattern.  But the standard deviations remain 
high: 3.42 years for chronic-use drugs, 2.74 years for intermediate-use drugs, 
and 3.15 years for acute-use drugs. 
 
 273. These category definitions were adopted from a study that examined the dura-
tion of the pivotal efficacy trials supporting approval of new molecular entity drugs and 
new biological products between 2005 and 2012.  Nicholas Downing et al., Clinical 
Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Approval of Novel Therapeutic Agents, 2005–2012, 
311 JAMA 368, 369 (2014).  Categorization was based primarily on the first approved 
package insert, including the Indication statement and the Dosage and Administration 
instructions.  The first approved package insert was obtained from Drugs@FDA.  If not 
available from Drugs@FDA, the package insert was retrieved from the patent term res-
toration application or, failing that, the earliest edition of the PHYSICIAN’S DESK 
REFERENCE in which it appeared.  Where none of these sources provided the first pack-
age insert, characterization of the first approved indication statement was taken from 
the text of the patent term restoration application, the FDA approval letter, or reporting 
in the PINK SHEET when the drug was first approved.  Two individuals performed the 
categorization: the author, based on her expertise in pharmaceutical regulatory law, and 
an associate professor of family and community medicine at the University of Missouri, 
based on his training and expertise in the practice of medicine.  Each was blinded to 
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Without regard to therapeutic category, drugs tested, approved, and la-
beled for longer-term use consistently require longer clinical development pro-
grams.  This is not because trials mimic real world use.  Rather, the overall 
length of a clinical program reflects the speed and ease of progression from 
phase 1 through phase 2 to phase 3 and the duration of the phase 3 trials.  The 
latter in turn reflects the trial size, the disease and disease stage, the hypothe-
sized outcome, the trial endpoints, as well as perhaps the drug’s mechanism of 
action, the nature of alternative treatments on the market, and various other 
considerations.  The conditions targeted by the 282 drugs for chronic use in the 
dataset include common disorders of aging (such as osteoarthritis and hyper-
tension) as well as serious psychiatric conditions (depression, anxiety, and 
schizophrenia) and life-threatening but ultimately chronic viral infections (HIV 
and hepatitis).  They also include treatments for Alzheimer’s disease, Parkin-
son’s disease, multiple sclerosis, and fibromyalgia, as well as treatments for 
some slowly progressing cancers, such as prostate cancer.  Again, these drugs 
are consistently associated with longer overall clinical testing periods. 
b.  Established Pharmacologic Class 
In addition to grouping together drugs that are for acute use and drugs that 
are for chronic use, therapeutic categories group together drugs for diseases 
that have distinct molecular causes and divide drugs for diseases with common 
molecular cause.274  They may group together some drugs with different mech-
anisms of action and separate some drugs with the same basic mechanism of 
action.275  Although there does not appear to be a publicly available database 
that categorizes all of the drugs in this dataset by mechanism of action or the 
molecular cause of the disease in question, FDA captures some of the same 
considerations when it assigns an “established pharmacologic class” to ap-
proved drugs.  A “pharmacological class” is defined by reference to three at-
tributes of the active moieties that fall within it: mechanism of action, physio-
logical effect, and chemical structure.276  FDA designates a pharmacological 
class as the “established pharmacologic class” for an approved indication of a 
specific active moiety if the class is both scientifically valid and clinically 
meaningful with respect to that moiety and indication.277 
 
 274. PAVING THE WAY, supra note 225, at 17. 
 275. E.g., Littman, supra note 203, at 22. 
 276. OFFICE OF NEW DRUGS, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DETERMINING THE 
ESTABLISHED PHARMACOLOGIC CLASS FOR USE IN THE HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING 
INFORMATION 1 (July 18, 2013), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Center-
sOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTo-
bacco/CDER/ManualofPoliciesProcedures/UCM361380.pdf. 
 277. Id. at 2.  The class is scientifically valid if evidence shows that it is known (not 
merely assumed), relevant, and specific to the indication.  It is clinically meaningful if 
understanding the pharmacological effect enhances the ability of healthcare profession-
als to understand the physiologic basis of the indication or their ability to anticipate 
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The 570 drugs in the dataset (minus the five tested overseas) were sorted 
by established pharmacologic class, and the seventy-five drugs that lacked an 
assigned class were dropped.278  FDA placed twenty-three of the remaining 490 
drugs into more than one class; the nine that contained more than one active 
ingredient were dropped, and the remaining fourteen were considered in each 
category assigned.  Table 4 provides the summary statistics for any classes 
containing more than four drugs. 
 
Table 4. Length of Testing Period by Established Pharmacologic 
Class 
Established Pharmacologic Class (n) Mean Median 
St. 
Dev. 
radioactive diagnostic agents and con-
trast agents (11) 
2.95 2.97 1.04 
serotonin-1b and serotonin-1d receptor 
agonist (6) 
2.99 2.94 1.05 
histamine-1 (H1) and histamine-2 (H2) 
receptor antagonist (8) 
3.05 2.88 1.49 
quinolone antimicrobial (7) 3.68 3.57 1.23 
cephalosporin antibacterial (13) 3.96 3.30 1.66 
corticosteroid (7) 4.17 3.97 2.14 
HMG-CoA reductase inhibitor (6) 4.21 3.07 2.12 
cholinesterase inhibitor (4) 4.38 4.10 1.45 
topoisomerase inhibitor (6) 4.59 5.17 1.91 
cholinergic muscarinic antagonist (4) 4.62 3.79 2.26 
proton pump inhibitor (7) 4.74 4.45 2.04 
retinoid (4) 4.79 4.94 0.65 
beta-2 adrenergic agonist (4) 5.00 5.01 2.04 
dihydropyridine calcium channel 
blocker (6) 
5.04 4.06 2.79 
 
undesirable effects that may be associated with the active moiety or pharmacologic 
class. 
 278. FDA regulations state that if a product belongs to an established pharmaco-
logic class, the approved labeling must identify the class.  21 C.F.R. § 201.57(a)(6) 
(2017) (requiring a statement under Indications and Usage that “(Drug) is a (name of 
class) indicated for (indication(s))”).  FDA has also issued a forty-five-page guidance 
document listing active moieties by their established pharmacological class.  FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA ESTABLISHED 
PHARMACOLOGIC CLASS (EPC) TEXT PHASE,  https://www.fda.gov/down-
loads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/LawsActsan-
dRules/UCM428333.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2018) (listing active moieties by estab-
lished pharmacological class). 
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Table 4. Length of Testing Period by Established Pharmacologic 
Class 
Established Pharmacologic Class (n) Mean Median 
St. 
Dev. 
human immunodeficiency virus 1 non-
nucleoside analog reverse transcriptase 
inhibitor (5) 5.05 4.96 0.62 
prostaglandin analog (5) 5.16 4.16 2.25 
estrogen and progestin (4) 5.22 3.48 4.01 
azole antifungal (9) 5.22 5.20 1.65 
angiotensin converting enzyme inhibi-
tor (7) 5.34 4.80 1.33 
bisphosphonate (5) 5.49 6.28 1.83 
gonadotropin releasing hormone recep-
tor agonist (4) 5.78 6.23 1.71 
alpha-adrenergic blocker (7) 5.92 5.07 2.37 
nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory (10) 5.99 5.31 2.50 
serotonin-3 receptor antagonist (5) 6.10 4.74 2.80 
kinase inhibitor (15) 6.54 6.20 2.47 
anti-coagulant (4)  6.73 7.41 2.97 
nucleoside metabolic inhibitor (5) 6.84 6.91 2.52 
anti-epileptic agent (10)  6.98 6.49 2.51 
beta-adrenergic blocker (9) 7.39 6.66 3.48 
serotonin reuptake inhibitor (13) 8.33 7.44 3.93 
atypical antipsychotic (10) 8.55 8.05 4.42 
anti-arrhythmic (7) 8.88 9.64 2.35 
norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor (6) 9.16 7.76 5.39 
radioactive diagnostic agents and con-
trast agents (11) 2.95 2.97 1.04 
serotonin-1b and serotonin-1d receptor 
agonist (6) 2.99 2.94 1.05 
atypical antipsychotic (10) 8.55 8.05 4.42 
anti-arrhythmic (7) 8.88 9.64 2.35 
norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor (6) 9.16 7.76 5.39 
 
The consistently smaller standard deviations in this chart (as compared to 
the standard deviations when sorting drugs by therapeutic categorization or du-
ration of treatment) invites the hypothesis that the pharmacologic class of a 
new drug – which combines its mechanism of action, physiological effect, 
chemical structure – directly influences the length of the clinical testing period.  
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This is consistent with the discussion in Part IV, which suggested that the 
length of any particular premarket research and development process is likely 
to depend on factors like the disease and its biological process, the chemical 
structure of the drug and its mechanism of action, and the possible outcomes 
(physiological effects) to be tested. 
This interpretation is important because it suggests the length of any par-
ticular program will depend on factors generally outside the sponsor’s control.  
This is key to understanding the problem with the innovation paradox in the 
field of medicine.  If longer premarket programs are associated with shorter 
post-market exclusivity, and if sponsors have limited control over the time that 
will be needed to bring a particular product (active ingredient, product features, 
disease, outcome) to market, the paradox may lead rational companies to select 
different products – with shorter timelines – in the first instance.  Companies 
may avoid important areas of medical need.  Many of the drugs in the dataset 
were not included in this analysis of established pharmacologic class, however, 
and more data points would be helpful to explore this correlation. 
F.  Scope of These Findings 
The goal of this Article is to describe the premarket research and devel-
opment program for new medicines in order to better understand the innovation 
paradox.  It focuses on approved new drugs with new active ingredients be-
cause FDA has published the regulatory milestones for most of those drugs.  
The agency has not, however, calculated a regulatory review period for all new 
medicines that might be of interest, and the dataset includes some drugs that 
may skew the results. 
First, the analysis does not reflect many new active ingredient drugs that 
started clinical trials in the mid to late 2000s.  The dataset includes data for 221 
drugs that started trials in the 1990s but data for only 100 drugs that started 
trials in the 2000s.  When this Article was being written, there were more than 
seventy pending patent term restoration requests for approved new drugs for 
which FDA had not yet calculated a regulatory review period.  All of these 
drugs were approved in 2012 or later, and presumably all were in clinical trials 
in the mid to late 2000s.  As a result, the analysis does not fully reflect changes 
in the premarket research and development paradigm – including statutory and 
regulatory changes, evolution in clinical trial and statistical methodologies, ad-
vances in computer-assisted data analysis, scientific discoveries and opportu-
nities, and changes in the regulatory culture – in the 2000s. 
Second, the analysis does not capture new active ingredient drugs for 
which FDA did not calculate a regulatory review period.  This includes any for 
which a request was not timely filed at PTO, any requests abandoned or with-
drawn before FDA calculated the regulatory review period, and any for which 
the NDA holders neglected to seek restoration to which they were entitled.  The 
original spreadsheet from PTO indicates that the first two groups are small (in 
the single digits).  The third group is surprisingly large.  A review of historical 
editions of the Orange Book identified more than 100 drugs approved in the 
69
Lietzan: Drug Innovation Paradox
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
108 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
time period covered by this dataset that were awarded new chemical entity ex-
clusivity but were not in the patent term restoration dataset.  Most appear to 
have listed patents, and it is unclear why the NDA holders did not request pa-
tent term restoration.  One possibility is mistake.  Another possibility is that 
these companies were already slated to enjoy fourteen or more years of effec-
tive patent life on any patents they might have sought to restore (listed or 
not).279  Where the second explanation is true, it would be important to learn 
more.  Some could be instances where a particularly long research and devel-
opment period eliminated all effective patent life on the active ingredient pa-
tent, leaving only later-expiring patents on formulation and the like.  In these 
cases, fourteen years of effective patent life might not translate to fourteen 
years of effective market exclusivity.  In the alternative, some could be in-
stances where a swift premarket program led to approval with fourteen years 
remaining on the active ingredient patent.  In such a case, the firm might well 
have enjoyed fourteen years of effective market exclusivity. 
Third, the dataset does not include biological medicines, which are li-
censed under a different statute, the Public Health Service Act.280  Neither the 
Orange Book nor the newly established Purple Book for biologics lists patents 
claiming these products, and there was therefore no proxy for the beginning of 
the preclinical period for purposes of the analysis in Part V.B.  FDA has pub-
lished the regulatory review period for these products, however, and it would 
have been possible to conduct the analyses in Parts V.C. through V.E. 
Although this analysis was not performed, there is good reason to think 
the results would have been similar.  Although biologics are licensed under a 
different statute, as a scientific and regulatory matter the premarket schemes 
are mostly harmonized.281  Therapeutic biologics have been regulated by the 
 
 279. One example is Actonel (risedronate sodium), approved in March 1998 with 
five years of NCE exclusivity.  Letter from James Bilstad, Dir., Office of Drug Evalu-
ation II, to Hina Wu, Senior Scientist (Mar. 27, 1998) (on file with FDA).  The NDA 
holder listed three patents, and the earliest to expire (U.S. Patent No. 5,583,122) was 
slated to expire in December 2013 – more than fourteen years after NDA approval.  
There was no point seeking patent term restoration. 
 280. At the time this Article was drafted, FDA’s website listed 143 therapeutic bi-
ological products with approved biologics license applications.  Ctr. for Drug Evalua-
tion & Research, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., List of Licensed Biological Products with 
(1) Reference Product Exclusivity and (2) Biosimilarity or Interchangeability Evalua-
tions to Date, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalPro-
cess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/TherapeuticBio-
logicApplications/Biosimilars/UCM560162.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). 
 281. See Krista Hessler Carver, Jeffrey Elikan & Erika Lietzan, An Unofficial Leg-
islative History of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 Food 
& Drug. L.J. 671, 687 (2010); see Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act 
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–115, § 123(f), 111 Stat. 2296, 2324 (directing FDA to “take 
measures to minimize differences in the review and approval of products required to 
have approved biologics license applications under section 351 of the [PHSA] and 
products required to have approved new drug applications under section 505(b)(1) of 
the [FDCA]”). 
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unit at FDA responsible for drugs – not the unit responsible for other biologics 
like vaccines – since 2003.282  The same clinical trial regulations apply to both 
new drugs and therapeutic biologics, and FDA’s guidance documents on pre-
market research and development – such as the exploratory IND guidance, the 
statistical methodology guidance, the cancer endpoints guidance, and the early 
Alzheimer’s guidance – apply equally to both.  FDA generally does not differ-
entiate, and the statutory and regulatory paradigm does not provide any reason 
to think that the findings in this Article would not also apply to therapeutic 
biological medicines. 
Fourth, the dataset includes forty-five new drugs that did not receive new 
chemical entity exclusivity.  FDA denies NCE status when a drug contains the 
same active moiety as a previously approved drug.283  The standard for patent 
term restoration is different and more forgiving.284  The inclusion of non-NCE 
drugs may have skewed the results of the analysis because the premarket pro-
grams for these drugs may have been reduced if the same firm had developed 
the earlier drug that received exclusivity.  If the firm owned the application for 
the prior drug (or was willing to pay for the right to reference it), relevant data 
from the first application could be used.  In this situation, the firm might have 
performed only a phase 2 dose-ranging study and the phase 3 pivotal trials.  
Excluding the five drugs studied overseas and the thirty-three drugs approved 
under the antibiotic provisions prior to 1997 (because they were not eligible 
for NCE status), the average clinical period for the non-NCE drugs in the da-
taset is 4.59 years, noticeably shorter than the average for the NCE drugs, 
which is 6.18 years.  It is unclear whether approval of non-NCE drugs with 
shorter premarket timelines affects some therapeutic categories or established 
pharmacologic classes in the dataset more than others.  The correlation between 
pharmacologic class and length of clinical program might be more clear if one 
excluded the new drugs that were not NCEs and if it were possible to obtain 
the regulatory review period information for all NCEs. 
Finally, the dataset does not include new drugs that are not new active 
ingredients.  This includes new drugs for which patent term restoration requests 
were submitted and rejected, as well as new drugs for which patent term resto-
ration requests were never submitted.  Companies could face an innovation 
paradox when engaging in incremental innovation with old, established mole-
cules, but the nature of the innovation is different, and a different analysis – 
beyond the scope of this Article – would need to be performed. 
 
 
 282. Drug and Biological Product Consolidation, 68 Fed. Reg. 38,067 (June 26, 
2003). 
 283. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 284. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The problem explored in this Article is the paradoxical relationship be-
tween drug innovation and its reward.  The reward shrinks (or, at best, stays 
flat) when premarket innovation takes longer.  On the whole this should lead 
to post-invention efficiency, minimizing the impact of any endogenous factors 
contributing to the premarket program length.285  It also means that companies 
are unlikely to make choices specifically to delay market entry.  With the clock 
ticking on post-approval market exclusivity, there is no benefit to doing so.286 
The historical and empirical work in this Article leads to three important 
insights about the paradoxical relationship between drug innovation and its re-
ward. 
First, the length of any particular drug’s premarket research and develop-
ment program may depend heavily on factors like the disease and its therapeu-
tic category, our current understanding of the causal pathways of the disease, 
the proposed therapeutic outcome, the chemical structure of the active ingredi-
ent, its mechanism of action, its physiological effect, and FDA’s innate con-
servatism.  These exogenous factors are beyond the sponsor’s control in the 
sense that any seasoned firm with qualified personnel picking one premarket 
program instead of another would face the same issues.287 
Second, certain drugs are simply going to take longer to develop.  These 
will include some drugs for some early stage cancers that have a longer time to 
progression and mortality, for instance, as well as drugs for use in the earliest 
 
 285. For instance, Bristol-Myers Squibb historically required eight months “to pro-
duce and activate a new study protocol” but has made “efforts to improve the review 
cycle” and reduce the internal process to five months.  REBECCA A. ENGLISH ET AL., 
TRANSFORMING CLINICAL RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES: CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 34 (2010). 
 286. According to Professor Roin, the product-development management literature 
reveals an “accepted wisdom” that because time to market “is . . . the most important 
factor affecting the internal rate of return” on investment, “most firms work hard to get 
their inventions onto the market as quickly as possible.”  Benjamin N. Roin, The Case 
for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 713 
(2014).  He found five explanations in the literature, one of which seems particularly 
salient here: that “delays diminish the innovator’s window of opportunity to earn a 
profit from its invention.”  Id. at 714. 
 287. Other exogenous factors may contribute to the length of a particular premarket 
testing program, including raw materials that are difficult to find, the fact that studies 
must be performed where experts are available to serve as investigators rather than 
where patients may be located, and bureaucratic delays at academic institutions provid-
ing clinical trial workforces.  ENGLISH ET AL., supra note 285, at 31, 35–36 (“U.S. aca-
demic institutions typically take longer to navigate the approval process (i.e., from 
budget/contract to IRB approval) compared to private or academic institutions 
abroad.”) (citing Dr. Woodcock for proposition that “[w]hen patient recruitment is im-
peded, the trial is delayed, sometimes by years, until the number of patients required 
by the study protocol can be enrolled”). 
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stages of neurodegenerative diseases if the therapeutic goal is delay or preven-
tion of the ultimate outcome.  They will include drugs for long-term use for 
conditions (such as diabetes mellitus) that significantly precede clinical events 
of interest (such as heart disease, stroke, and kidney damage).  They will in-
clude drugs intended for less well understood body systems, like the central 
nervous system, where even novel surrogate markers may be years off. 
Third, the choices faced by a company in the new drug paradigm are gen-
erally not choices among more and less efficient routes to the same end result.  
A new drug in the federal drug scheme is a particular combination of active 
ingredient, product features, and the labeling (disease and outcome).  The re-
search performed by a drug’s sponsor thus defines the product approved by 
FDA at the end of the day.  This means the sponsor’s choices during the re-
search and development period are tantamount to choices about the product to 
be pursued.  The Paraplatin example illustrates why it may generally be more 
rational to select a short runway with a limited approval than a long runway 
with a broader approval.  This decision may be due to the time value of money, 
but the innovation paradox suggests that it may also result from the price paid 
in lost effective patent life when clinical programs run longer. 
As a matter of public policy we may prefer that companies facing this 
choice select the product with the shorter runway.  But in some cases a com-
pany will not have that option.  If a company must choose between a long run-
way and a different product altogether, the innovation paradox may mean 
whole areas of medicine remain underdeveloped.  The implication for social 
welfare is that we may have a profound interest in breaking the paradox – in 
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